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ABSTRACT
The philosophy of action is about agents and actions. As such,
it has both a metaphysical and an ethical dimension. My
dissertation is divided into three papers.
The first is wholly metaphysical, concentrating on the
ontology of actions. : explore the relationship between actions
reported by a certain class of "by"-sentences and argue that the
relationship is identity:.
The second paper concerns the bearing that ontological
conclusions about actiona have on ethics. I argue that, except
for the claim that there are no such entities as actions,
ontological conclusions about actions do not make a substantive
difference to ethical thecry.
In the third paper, I concentrate on the ethical issue of
an agent's responsibility for her actions. I argue that an agent
is responsible only if she could have done otherwise, as long as
"could have done otherwise" is interpreted as meaning "would have
done otherwise if she had so chosen."
Thesis Supervisor: Judith Jarvis Thomson
Title: Professor of Philosophy
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ESSAY ONE
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTIONS
REPORTED BY
"BY" -SENTENCES
8PART ONE
1 The Question
Suppose
(1) Brutus killed Caesar by stabbing hi.m
is true. Then it would be natural to conclude that there was an
event that was a killing of Caesar by Brutus and that there was
an event that was a stabbing of Caesar by Brutus. Both of these
events are actions of Brutus's. In what relation does the event
that is the stabbing stand to the event that is the killing?
Given the truth of a certain class1 of sentences with the
form
(2) X does alpha BY doing beta
in which X is the agent and "does alpha" and "doing beta" are
replaced with action verbs, it is natural to conclude that there
is an event that is X's doing alpha and there and event that is
X's doing beta, and that these events stand in some relation to
I The scope of my discussion is going to be restricted in
two ways. First, I am going to limit the verbs under discussion
to action verbs as we commonly construe them without addressing
what sets acts apart from other events and exactly which verbs
fall into the set of action verbs. Second, there are some action
sentences which do not otfer themselves up for the kind of
analysis that I am suggesting. For example, "By staying up all
night and cramming, I passed the exam" needs a different sort of
analysis from "Brutus killed Caesar by stabbing him." I shall
not be addressing the former, and do not know how to characterize
them except to say that there are going to be some exceptions
that do not fit any of the proposed analyses. Now, this is not
to say that I am going to dismiss all of the difficult cases as
exceptions. There is a large literature surrounding a certain
paradigm of controversial sentences, such as "Brutus killed
Caesar by stabbing him" that require an analysis. They are by no
means "the easy cases." These are the cases with which I shall
be concerned. However, I am not going to propose any systematic
way of delimiting the set of sentences in question.
one another. I shall consider three theories, each of which
yields an answer to the question:
In what relation does X's doing alpha stand to X's doing
beta when X does alpha by doing beta?
Two of the theories, Parthood Theory and Trope Theory, though
they yield an answer to this question, were not developed with
this question in mind. Identity Theory, by contrast, developed
out of a question about the relation between actions reported by
"by"-sentences.
Once we have seen what each of these theories says generally
about this issue, I shall consider specific ways in which each of
the theories might analyze "by" in order to capture the
relationship that it proposes between the agent's doing alpha and
the agent's doing beta.
The first theory, Parthood Theory, was designed to give an
account of the part-whole relation as it applies to acts and
events. In spelling out the details of the relationship between
events and their parts, Parthood Theory yields an answer to our
question. It says that X's doing beta may be identical with X's
doing alpha or it may be a proper part of the X's doing alpha.
what Parthood Theory decides in each case depends upon whether
the "by" statement is timespanning or synchronous. A statement
is timespanning if, as Jonathan Bennett puts it, "what makes it
true that X [does alpha] by [doing beta] is the fact that because
X [does beta] he caused something to occur later" (Bennett, p.
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194).2 Statements like "Brutus killed Caesar by stabbing him"
and "he poisoned the inhabitants by operating the pump" are
timespanning. By operating the pump, the pumper caused it to be
the case that the inhabitants later became poisoned. By stabbing
Caesar, Brutus caused it to be the case that Caesar later died.
By contrast, the truth of synchronous "by" statements is not
dependent upon the agent's causing something to occur later on.
For example, "by crossing the finish line first he won the race"
is synchronous because his crossing the finish line first did not
cause him to later win the race, it made it the case at that very
moment that he won the race. Parthood Theory says that in
timespanning cases, X's doing beta is a proper part of X's doing
alpha and as such, X's doing beta does not take as much time as
X's doing alpha. In synchronous cases, X's doing beta is
identical to X's doing alpha and as such, they have exactly the
same temporal extent. with respect to our original example,
Parthood Theory claims that the killing and the stabbing are
different actions, and that the stabbing is a proper part of the
killing. The stabbing is complete before the killing is because
the killing, unlike the stabbing, is not complete until Caesar's
death. It results from this theory that actions include as parts
much more than bodily movements. They can and often do extend
beyond the movement of the body to include some of the movement's
effects. Judith Jarvis Thomson's account of Parthood Theory is
7 All references to Bennett are from Jonathan Bennett's
Events and Their Names (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1988).
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the version of it that I shall concentrate on.
The second theory under consideration will be Bennett's
Trope Theory of events. Trope Theory is a detailed general
theory of events. It provides an account of what events are.
Although its primary aim is much more ambitious, in spelling out
the theory of events, it yields an answer to our question.
Trope Theory gives the same general answer as Parthood Theory
does. That is, Trope Theory says that for timespanning cases,
X's doing alpha and X's doing beta are different events because
they are instances of different properties. It asserts an
identity in synchronous cases. However, the reason Trope Theory
gives for this answer is very different from Parthood Theory's,
for Trope Theory disagrees with Parthood Theory that X's doing
alpha and X's doing beta have different temporal extents. With
respect to our original example, Trope Theory says that Brutus's
killing of Caesar and Brutus's stabbing of Caesar are co-temporal
yet different events. When I present the detailed account of the
theory, it will become clear how it supports this claim.
The third theory, and the one that I shall be defending is
the Identity Theory. It was initially developed by Elizabeth
Anscombe to answer the question about "by" with which we are
concerned. This theory says that when X does alpha by doing beta,
then X's doing alpha is the same entity as X's doing beta. With
respect to our original example, "the killing of Caesar by
Brutus" and "the stabbing of Caesar by Brutus" are different ways
of describing the same entity. It turns out on Identity Theory
12
that every action is identical to a bodily movement. As well as
Anscombe, advocates of the theory include Donald Davidson and
Jennifer Hornsby.
Let us assess each theory for its strengths and weaknesses.
2 Parthood Theory
Parthood Theory says that, in timespanning cases, if someone
does alpha by doing beta then the action that is X's doing alpha
is different from the action that is X's doing beta. The claim
is that X's doing beta is a proper part of X's doing alpha but is
not identical with it. Thus, when Brutus kills Caesar by
stabbing him, Brutus's stabbing of Caesar is a proper part of
Brutus's killing of Caesar. A Parthood Theorist denies an
identity in this case, claiming that the killing has parts that
the stabbing does not have. For example, the killing includes
the death of Caesar as a part, whereas the stabbing does not.
Not only does this indicate that they have different parts, but
it also indicates that they have different temporal extents.
Since the death of Caesar, which is a part of the killing, occurs
after the stabbing, Parthood Theory says that the killing lasts
longer than the stabbing does. Since the killing and the
stabbing have different parts and different temporal extents,
they must be different events.
Parthood Theory has two features which make it seem an
attractive way of answering the question. First, it agrees with
our usual say of speaking about the causal relations between
13
actions and the actions and events that they cause. We never
say, for example, that killings cause deaths. We shall see that
Identity Theory does make this claim, and needs to explain this
oddity. Since a death is a part of a killing for Parthood
Theory, killings do not cause deaths, they include them, as noted
above, as proper parts. This is not to say, of course, that a
killing can never cause a death on the parthood account.
Brutus's killing of Caesar might have so shocked Marcus that the
killing caused Marcus to have a heart attack and die. If this
were the case, then it would be true that Brutus's killing of
Caesar caused Marcus's death, but it certainly would not, if we
were following Parthood Theory, be true that it caused Caesar's
death.
The second appealing feature of Parthood Theory is that it
accounts for parts of actions in exactly the same way that it
accounts for parts of other events. Actions and events are not
treated differently in their metaphysical analyses on the
parthood account. Since actions are events, it makes sense to
think that they can be complex entities, composed of other events
and other actions. Parthood Theory spells out the complexity of
actions in some detail, providing an account of how the parts
relate to the whole. For example, a very rudimentary analysis of
Brutus's killing of Caesar might look something like this:
The killing is composed of events causally related in a specific
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way which makes them parts of the whole action "Brutus's killing
Caesar." Since it attempts to spell out the part-whole relation
with respect to actions, Parthood Theory seems a promising route
to take if we are concerned with the complexity of actions.
2.1 Challenging Parthood Theory
The theory faces one major challenge to which I do not
believe it can provide a convincing reply. This is an argument
to the effect that the tempora. claim it makes in timespanning
cases is false. If Parthood Theory's account of the times of
actions is wrong, then so also is its account of the parts of
actions. For this account of the times of actions depends for its
plausibility upon the way that the theory breaks actions down
into parts. As a result, the challenge is a very serious one.
Both Identity Theory and Trope Theory reject the temporal
claim using the No Further Effort argument (Bennett names it "No
Further Effort" in Bennett, p. 196). Using the example of
Brutus's killing of Caesar, this argument says:
Actions are over when the agent is no longer doing anything
relevant to the action.
Once Brutus has stabbed Caesar he is no longer doing
anything relevant to the killing of Caesar.
Therefore, once the stabbing is over, the killing must be
over.
The argument can be generalized to all timespanning cases of "by"
statements. Whenever an agent X does alpha by doing beta, the No
Further Effort argument says that X's doing alpha is over when
X's doing beta is because the agent no longer needs to do
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anything relevant to his doing alpha. The intuition behind the
argument is that once there is no further effort required from
the agent to complete the action, the action is complete. This
argument also accounts for our intuitions regarding synchronous
cases. In these cases, no further effort is required on the part
of the agent in order for the action to be complete.
I believe that this intuition is a very strong one, and that
rejecting the intuition and the No Further Effort argument leads
to some conclusions that are not only unusual, but are also
implausible. In particular, Parthood Theory's way of
understanding the times of actions yields the odd result that
actions can continue long after the agent whose actions they are
is dead. Thus, Brutus might die immediately after stabbing
Caesar but before Caesar is dead, yet Parthood Theory would say
that Brutus's action of killing Caesar continues nonetheless. It
seems very implausible to claim that Brutus's actions continue
after he is dead, and this result gives us a good reason to
accept the No Further Effort argument. It is much more plausible
to claim that Brutus's actions are all over once he is dead.
Naturally, things that Brutus has done may cause events that
happen after he dies and these events may warrant new ways of
describing his action, but he certainly cannot do anything
further once he is dead; his actions must be complete.
2.2 Parthood Theory Responds
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In Acts and Other Events,3 Thomson presents an example in an
attempt to undermine the No Further Effort argument.
In the example, Judy cleans the kitchen floor by pouring
Stuff on it, waiting for Stuff to dissolve the dirt as it dries,
and then sweeping up the residue. According to Thomson, Judy is
cleaning the floor from the time she pours on Stuff until the
time it finishes evaporating, and throughout the time she is
sweeping up the dust. Thomson illustrates Judy's cleaning the
floor as follows (rectangles indicate time-stretches; points
indicate time-points):
T T' T"
-4%Lj6 IS tUFFF'. LAS-r oP
It seems very plausible on any theory to say that Judy's cleaning
the floor is not complete until the end of T". According to
Parthood Theory, Judy is cleaning the floor from the beginning of
T until the end of T', and throughout T". Stuff's dissolving the
dirt while Judy waits for it to dry is as much a part of Judy's
cleaning the floor as her pouring Stuff on the floor and her
sweeping up the dust are.
Since we find it plausible that Judy's cleaning continues
beyond Judy's pouring Stuff, Thomson urges that we should find it
equally plausible in the following case that Diane's cleaning
* Acts and other Events, Judith Thomson (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1977).
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continues beyond her pouring her product. Diane lives down the
street from Judy and she uses a newer product - super-Stuff.
Super-stuff not only dissolves the dirt, it also disintegrates
it. Thus, once Diane pours Super-Stuff on the floor, she does
not have to do anything more towards cleaning the floor. Her
action is illustrated as follows:
r T'
5taPEQ--STU~F'S LAS r-oo
She pours Super-Stuff on the floor at T, Super-Stuft does its
work between T and T'. T' marks the time that the last of Super-
Stuff evaporates, and, according to Parthood Theory, the
completion of Diane's cleaning the floor. Advocates of the No
Further Effort argument would, of course, claim that Diane's
cleaning of the floor is complete at the end of T, once she has
finished pouring Super-Stuff on the floor.
The force of the two examples is supposed to be that if we
are going to claim that Judy's cleaning the floor is going on
while Stuff is doing its work, then we must agree with Parthood
Theory's claim that Stuff's doing its work is part of Judy's
cleaning. If we say that, it appears that, analogously, Diane's
cleaning the floor is going on while Super-Stuff does its work:
we have no basis upon which to deny that Super-Stuff's doing its
work is part of Diane's cleaning. If anything, Super-Stuff
appears to play a larger part in Diane's cleaning her floor than
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Stuff does in Judy's cleaning her floor. This undermines the No
Further Effort Argument because it looks as if Diane's action is
not over when she has no more effort to put into it.
2.3 Assessing Parthood Theory's Response
This example does not give us a convincing reason for giving
up the No Further Effort argument. There is no dispute that if
we say that Stuff's dissolving and disintegrating the dirt is a
part of Judy's action, then we need to say that Super-Stuff's
dissolving and disintegrating the dirt is a part of Diane's
action. However, what I and other advocates of the No Further
Effort argument deny is the claim that anything stuff or Super-
stuff does is a part of any of the actions of Judy and Diane.
One good reason for denying this comes out when we consider what
would happen if the agents were to die immediately after pouring
their products. Diane's floor would become clean, Judy's would
not. Now unless we want to say that an agent's actions can
continue after she is dead, Diane had better be done with her
cleaning when she no longer has anything to do for her floor to
become clean. What stuff and Super-Stuff do subsequently are
consequences of actions of Judy and Diane. It is what Judy and
Diane themselves do, not what the products they use do, that
counts as part of their action. This is not to say that Judy's
cleaning the floor is complete once she has poured Stuff on it.
It cannot be complete because Judy still has more work to do
after Stuff does its work.
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The question we need to address is: what makes it plausible
to say in this case that Judy is not done right after she pours
stuff, while Diane is done cleaning after she pours Super-Stuff?
Is it, as Parthood Theory maiintains, implausible to claim that
Judy's cleaning is not complete after she pours stuff, whereas
Diane's cleaning is complete after she pours Super-Stuff? No, we
may plausibly make this claim because there is a crucial
difference between Judy's cleaning the floor and Diane's cleaning
the floor. It seems correct to say that Judy is not finished
cleaning the floor in this case, not because Stuff is doing
something, but rather because Judy still has something to do. By
contrast, Diane has nothing left to do once she has poured Super-
Stuff. Advocates of No Further Effort agree with Parthood Theory
that Judy's action is not over as soon as she has poured Stuff on
the floor.
On the face of it, the intuition that these examples rely on
is the intuition that a floor-cleaning is not over until the
floor is clean. But if that is the point being made, then there
is no need for two separate cases to make the point. The claim
that Diane's floor is not clean as soon as she pours Super-Stuff
is uncontroversial. Super-Stuff still has some work to do. The
controversial question is whether the action that is Diane's
cleaning the floor is complete once she has poured Super-Stuff.
The reason for starting with the stuff example and subsequently
introducing the super-Stuff example is that in the stuff example
no one denies that Judy's cleaning the floor is not over as soon
20
as Judy has poured Stuff. But advocates of No Further Effort are
quick to agree to this claim because Judy still has work to do,
not because they concede that Stuff's doing its work is part of
Judy's cleaning the floor. It is the fact that Judy still has
some work to do, not the claim that the cleaning is not over
until the floor is clean, that gives the Stuff example its
initial force. We can see that this is the case by looking at a
variation of this example in which Judy's task is simplified.
Suppose that she needs only to sweep the floor; there is no Stuff
involved at all. She sweeps one half, takes a rest, and then
sweeps the other half. Any advocate of No Further Effort would
say that Judy's sweeping the floor in incomplete after she has
swept the first half because she still has some work to do; Judy
has not finished doing everything that she needs to do to get the
floor clean until she sweeps the other half of the floor. In the
original example, Stuff has very little to do with Judy's action
of cleaning the floor other than the fact that it gives Judy a
reason to take a break. Judy's cleaning the floor consists in
what Judy has to do; Stuff's cleaning the floor consists in what
Stuff has to do. Judy's cleaning the floor i.s not the same as
Stuff's cleaning the floor. Judy's cleaning the floor is not
over once she pours Stuff because Judy still has work to do.
Diane's cleaning the floor is over once she pours the Super-Stuff
because Diane has nothing left to do that is relevant to her
cleaning the floor. The rest is up to Super-Stuff, and its doing
its work is not a part of Diane's doing hers.
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Both Parthood Theory and theories that accept No Further
Effort need to claim that Judy's action is divided. Parthood
Theory has it divided during the time between the last of Stuff's
dissolving and Judy's sweeping up the dust. The No Further
Effort account has it divided during the time between Judy's
pouring and Judy's sweeping.
I believe that Parthood Theory has not provided an adequate
argument to counter the No Further Effort argument. In fact, the
plausibility of the claim that Judy's cleaning the floor is not
over once she pours Stuff depends on the very intuitions behind
the No Further Effort argument. In light of this weakness of
Parthood Theory, I think we should set aside its claim that in
timespanning cases of "by"-statements, the agent's doing beta is
a part of the agent's doing alpha and as a result, different from
it.
In considering Trope Theory and Identity Theory, both of
which use the argument from no Further Effort to establish the
times of actions, we shall see that No Further Effort is
compatible with two very different accounts of the relationship
between X's doing alpha and X's doing beta when X does alpha by
doing beta.
3 Trope Theory
With respect to the question posed at the outset, Trope
Theory says that Brutus's killing Caesar and Brutus's stabbing
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Caesar, just like any timespanning case of an agent's doing alpha
by doing beta, are co-temporal yet different events. What
remains unclear, however, is the theoretical machinery that
allows Trope Theory to make this claim seem like a plausible one.
Before we can assess the claim, we need to have a look at the
theory.
According to Trope Theory, events, and hence actions, are
tropes. A trope is an instance of a property. Bennett provides
an example:
My house is a concrete particular that has whiteness and
other properties; whiteness is an abstract universal that is
possessed by my house and other particulars; and the
whiteness of my house is a trope, an abstract particular.
It is unlike my house in that all that there is to it is
whiteness, and it is unlike whiteness in that it pertains
only to my house. (Bennett, p. 15-16).
As an instance of a property, a trope is both abstract and
particular. It is abstract because it is a property but
particular because it is just one instance of the property.
While the example of "the whiteness of my house" gives us some
idea of what a trope is, event tropes can be much more complex
entities.
Initially, based on Jaegwon Kim's theory that an event is
the instantiation of a property by a substance at a time, Bennett
says that an event is the instantiation of a complex property P*
at a spatiotemporal zone. He interprets this as meaning that
each event is an instance of a complex property that occurs at a
certain spatiotemporal zone. The zone will usually be delimited
by a substance and a time, but Bennett leaves it open that this
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may not always be the case. As an instance of a property, an
event is a trope. Every event is to be understood as an instance
of a complex property P* that constitutes it. According to the
theory, the whole intrinsic truth about a given event e is that
it is an instance of the complex property that constitutes it,
i.e. that it is an instance of the constitutive property P*.
Given the complexity of events, we cannot know exactly what
property P* constitutes any given event e. But for illustrative
purposes, Bennett suggests the following example:
suppose that e is an instance - in a certain pebble S at a
time T - of the property of falling with an acceleration of
32ft/sec2 while rotating .68 times per second on an axis at
right angles to the line of the fall (Bennett, p. 94)
All of the properties of the fall outlined above are included in
the property that constitutes the event. That is, the whole
intrinsic truth about this event is that it is "an instance - in
a certain pebble S at a time T - the property..." and so on. The
parts of the complex trope that is constituted by P* are
themselves tropes, each constituted by simpler properties P.
Since the constitutive property P* is so complex, it need not be
the case that every term used to refer to the event refers to
every part of the event. For example, "this stone's fall" and
"this stone's dangerous fall" can refer to the same event. The
latter simply provides more information about it.
Different events can occupy the same zone if they are
differently constituted, that is, if the constitutive properties
are different. In short, more than one trope can occupy the same
spatiotemporal zone. This is what makes it possible for Trope
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Theory to say that Brutus's killing Caesar and Brutus's stabbing
Caesar are different events even though the No Further Effort
argument shows them to be co-temporal. They have different
constitutive properties, yet they occupy the same spatiotemporal
zone. According to Trope Theory, it is generally the case that
in timespanning cases, X's doing alpha and X's doing beta are co-
temporal but not identical.
Trope Theory is attractive because it provides a detailed
account of what events are and, if correct, would thereby prove
to be theoretically useful for much more than giving an answer to
the question at hand. In addition to being so ambitious in its
goals, Trope Theory is consistent with the No Further Effort
Argument. Hence, it is not subject to some of the temporal
difficulties of Parthood Theory.
3.1 Challenging Trope Theory
Trope Theory faces one serious and fundamental difficulty.
That is, we have good reason to question whether we should posit
the existence of tropes at all. In using tropes to characterize
events, we are explaining one problematic entity in terms of
another that is even more troublesome. Why should we think that
instances of properties form a distinct and fundamental
ontological category? Ontological simplicity demands that we
have good reasons before introducing a new entity into our
ontology. Bennett has not been successful at providing us with
good reasons.
25
3.2 Trope Theory Responds
Bennett is well aware that someone might consider tropes to
be a gratuitous and pointless addition to our ontology. Using a
non-event trope to illustrate, he outlines how the objection
might go:
This stone is a particular substance; its shape is a
universal property, flatness. The friends of tropes
are trying to introduce a third item that is particular
rather than universal but is a property rather than a
substance, namely, the flatness of this stone. This is
a gratuitous, pointless addition (Bennett, p. 90).
Bennett maintains that if we run a parallel objection in terms of
a property that we think of as construing an event, the objection
loses its force:
This stone is a particular substance; its way of moving
is a universal property, falling. The friends of
tropes are trying to introduce a third item, namely,
the fall of this stone...(Bennett, p. 90).
At this point, Bennett claims, the objection peters out.
3.3 Assessing Trope Theory's Response
It certainly does look as if the objection peters out at
this point. However, Bennett's construal of why it peters out is
somewhat misleading. When rephrased in terms of events, the
objection appears to lose its force because it is not the
existence of events, such as this stone's fall, that is at issue.
What is at issue is whether the stone's fall is a trope. That
is, is an event an instance of a complex property at a zone? By
reconsidering the objection in terms of a "property that is more
26
naturally thought of as constituting an event" (Bennett, p. 90),
Bennett is already assuming that events are tropes. The
challenger of Trope Theory need not deny the existence of events.
What she wants, and what she has not been given, is an argument
to the effect that events are tropes.
3.4 Conclusions About Trope Theory
The upshot of this discussion is that Trope Theory rests on
the dubious assumption that there are tropes. If we have no good
reason to suppose that there are entities that are tropes, then
we have no good reason to suppose that the best way to explain
actions and events is in terms of them.
The most attractive feature of Trope Theory is that it can
give a plausible account of the times of actions because it is
consistent with the No Further Effort argument. In addition, it
allows for some leniency in the way an event in described. The
next theory that we shall consider, Identity Theory, has these
features and an additional one besides - simplicity.
4 Identity Theory
Identity Theory is appealing above all for its simplicity.
Unlike the other theories, Identity Theory is much more modest in
its goals. It does not spell out the part-whole relationship in
events, nor does it give a detailed account of what event are.
But it is often the complexity of Parthood Theory and Trope
Theory that leads them into difficulties that the more modest
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goals of Identity Theory make it easy to avoid.
Identity Theory gives us the same answer in both
synchronous and timespanning "by" statements. For any case in
which an agent X does alpha by doing beta, X's doing alpha is X's
doing beta. With respect to the original example, Brutus's
killing Caesar is the same entity as Brutus's stabbing Caesar.
"Brutus's killing Caesar" and "Brutus's stabbing Caesar" are just
two different ways of describing it. Thus, like Trope Theory,
Identity Theory does not tie the reference of an event
description directly to the way in which the event is described.
It falls out of Identity Theory that every action is identical to
a bodily movement.'
4.1 Challenging Identity Theory
Identity Theory, although attractive, faces several
challenges. The first is a temporal one, familiar from the
discussion of Parthood Theory. Since Identity Theory claims that
Brutus's killing Caesar is identical with Brutus's stabbing
Caesar, the killing and the stabbing must have the same timespan.
Once the stabbing is over, the killing is over, even if Caesar is
not yet dead. However, according to Parthood Theory, the killing
took longer than the stabbing. Parthood Theory says that it is
' At least, every action that is done by doing something
that is a bodily movement is a bodily movement. Mental
activities, such as adding in one's head or making a decision,
are not bodily movements in the appropriate sense. I think that
a case can be made that they should not count as actions in any
case, but I shall not attend to that issue here.
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not true to say that Brutus killed Caesar before Caesar is dead
because the killing was not complete until Caesar's death. If
the killing, but not the stabbing, includes the death, that would
explain why the killing took longer than the stabbing.
The second challenge Identity Theory faces is that it does
not seem correct to say, for example, that the killing caused the
death. Yet if Brutus's killing Caesar and Brutus's stabbing
Caesar are the same entity, and if, as we all agree, the stabbing
caused the death, then it must be the case that the killing
caused the death. According to Parthood Theory, to say that
killings cause deaths is odd enough that it should at least give
us pause. We simply do not speak of killings causing deaths.
This problem exists for many of the timespanning "by" statements.
Parthood Theory agrees with our usual way of talking. Identity
Theory does not.
The third challenge to Identity Theory concerns necessary
properties. With respect to timespanning cases in particular,
the agent's doing alpha and the agent's doing beta usually have
different necessary properties. Killing, but not stabbings,
necessarily result in deaths; poisonings, but not pumpings,
necessarily result in people being poisoned. Yet if Brutus's
stabbing and Brutus's killing are the same entity, then they
ought to have the same necessary properties.
4.2 Identity Theory Responds to First Challenge
In order to meet the first objection - the temporal
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challenge - Identity Theory has to make a convincing case for the
claim that Brutus's killing Caesar does not last longer than
Brutus's stabbing Caesar, but rather takes exactly the same
amount of time. Identity Theory is consistent both with the
claim that it sounds odd to say that Brutus killed Caesar before
Caesar is dead, and with the claim that we might be unjustified
in saying that Brutus killed Caesar until after we know Caesar is
going to die. But the fact that something sounds odd or that we
might be unjustified in saying something does not entail that it
is false. According to Identity Theory, the reason that we tend
not to say that Brutus killed Caesar before Caesar dies is that
the description of Brutus's action as "a killing" remains
epistemically unavailable to us until Caesar dies. we are not
justified in calling it a killing until we are sure that it will
result in the death, but given that it does result in a death the
action is a killing all along.
Now, the epistemic response explains why we tend not to call
a killing "a killing" until we know that it will result in a
death. However, there are other odd cases that it does not seem
to explain. Consider the following oddity that does not admit of
any epistemic uncertainty:
Brutus killed Caesar in January. Caesar went south to
recover and in March he died as a result of the wounds
that Brutus had inflicted on him three month earlier.
Granted, it does sound very odd to put it like this. But oddity
does not entail falsity. In fact, there are other ordinary
language examples that would lead us to conclude that it makes
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perfect sense to say that Brutus killed Caesar before Caesar
died. Consider, for example, the following scenario:
Brutus stabbed Caesar. Caesar was losing blood very
rapidly and we rushed him to the hospital. When we
arrived, the doctor told us that there was nothing that
she could do to save Caesar. His death was inevitable.
At that point we knew that Brutus had killed Caesar.
We would find it exceedingly odd to say that at that point we
knew that Brutus was killing Caesar or that Brutus was in the
process of killing Caesar or that Brutus's killing of caesar was
taking place. As these two cases demonstrate, conclusions drawn
from oddities in ordinary language can often conflict with one
another. As a result, it does not seem as if we should reject
metaphysical claims purely on the basis of oddities in ordinary
language that might result from them.
Identity Theory finds independent support for the claim that
action reported in timespanning "by"-sentences are co-temporal
from the No Further Effort argument. Recall from our earlier
discussion of Parthood Theory that the No Further Effort argument
says that acts are over at the time when the agent is no longer
doing anything relevant to the action. Since once Brutus has
stabbed Caesar he is no longer doing anything relevant to the
killing of Caesar, it must be the case if No Further Effort is
correct that once the stabbing is over, the killing is over. The
intuition behind this argument is that once there is no further
effort required from the agent to complete the action, the action
is complete. As we have already seen, this is a very strong
intuition and figures prominently in the very counterexample
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intended to show No Further Effort to be false.
This argument lends support to the epistemic response
because it gives us a reason to believe that Brutus's action of
killing Caesar could have been over before Caesar's death,
despite the apparent oddity in making such a claim. Moreover,
accepting the No Further Effort argument gives us a plausible
reason to avoid the claim that a person's actions can continue
after his or her death. Accepting the temporal challenge means
accepting that even if Brutus had died before Caesar did,
Brutus's action of killing Caesar continued after Brutus was
dead. Advocates of the No Further Effort argument believe that
an agent's deeds must be done by the time the agent is dead.
Since the agent might die immediately after, for example,
plunging in the knife, the action must be complete when the agent
no longer needs to make any effort. Whereas the temporal
challenge requires that Brutus's killing Caesar lasts up to and
includes Caesar's death, according to Identity Theory Caesar's
death is in no way a part of the killing. If Identity Theory is
correct, the killing is completely distinct from the death.
4.3 Identity Theory Responds to Second Challenge
Recall that the causal objection against Identity Theory
says that if, for example, Brutus's stabbing Caesar causes
Caesar's death, and the stabbing is thus identical with the
killing, then Brutus's killing Caesar causes the death. It
sounds very odd to say that killings cause deaths, and Identity
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Theory must account for this oddity.
Identity Theory accepts the result that killings must be
considered as causes of deaths. Again, although it may sometimes
sound odd to say that killings cause deaths, the mere oddity does
not serve as solid grounds for a serious objection. Though it
might be odd in many circumstances to say that the killing caused
the death, it need not be considered false. As we did in
addressing the temporal objection, we can point to cases in which
it does not seem odd to suggest that the killing caused the
death. Consider an instance in which, upon arriving at the scene
of a death, one asks, "How did he die?" and receives the
response, "He was killed." It does seem as if, in a case like
this, what is being asked for is a cause of death. Now to say
that he was killed is to give, albeit in very general terms, a
cause of death. It is true that it is not as informative a
response as could be given. For example, "He was stabbed" might
be more informative. But "He was killed" certainly rules out
many natural ways in which his death might have been caused, and
would not strike one as an incredibly odd response to the
question, "How did he die?"
4.4 Identity Theory Responds to Third Challenge
The third objection to Identity Theory is that it fails to
give a coherent account of necessary properties of action. It is
often the case, particularly in timespanning when someone does
alpha by doing beta, that the actions in question seem to have
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different necessary properties. If it is a necessary property of
a killing that it results in a death, yet it is not a necessary
property of a stabbing that it results in a death, then they
cannot be identical. For surely identity requires that all the
properties be the same.
Identity Theory construes actions in a way that allows it to
explain and avoid this apparent objection. Given the way that
Identity Theory construes actions, it is de dicto necessary, but
not de re necessary that a killing result in a death. The
relevant way in which a killing necessarily results in a death
does not make trouble for the identity claim with respect to a
particular killing and a particular stabbing. We can make sense
of this claim by considering the following parallel to the
necessary properties objection from Quine:
Mathematicians may conceivably be said to be necessarily
rational and not necessarily two-legged; and cyclists two-
legged and not necessarily rational. But what of an
individual who counts among his eccentricities both
mathematics and cycling? (Word and Object, p. 199)1
We do not read this passage and conclude from it that one and the
same individual cannot be both a mathematician and a cyclist.
Clearly, an individual can be both. Identity Theory invites us
to treat the properties of actions and events in the same way
that we treat the rationality and two-leggedness of the
mathematician-cyclist. We need not conclude from the claim that
killings necessarily result in deaths and that stabbings do not
* Richard Cartwright brought this passage from Quine to my
attention.
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necessarily result in deaths that one and the same action cannot
be both a killing and a stabbing.
The difficulty arises only if we fail to consider the
difference between de dicto and de re modal statements. The de
dicto reading of the claim that killings necessarily result in
deaths and stabbings do not necessarily result in deaths says:
QC (x)(killingx -- x results in death)
- (x) (stabbingx-.x results in death).
The de re reading says:
(x)(killingx--*x results in death)
(x)(stabbingx-vnox results in death)
Identity Theory denies the de re reading, affirming only the de
dicto reading of necessary properties. If our variables range
over actions, the first pair of statements tells us that for any
action, in so far as the action happens to be a killing, it
results in a death. For example, Brutus's action might happen to
be a killing. If it is, it happens to result in a death. But,
according to this reading, no action is essentially a killing,
thus no action essentially results in a death. It is the de re
reading that requires that if an action is a killing then it is
essentially a killing and so essentially results in a death. If
we deny the de re reading of necessity, it is possible that the
very entity, i.e. Brutus's action, that we call "a killing" in
this world may not have resulted in Caesar's death in some other
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possible world.6 If Identity Theory is true, there is no need to
respond differently in the case of actions from the way we would
respond in the case of individuals. Just as our mathematician-
cyclist is neither essentially a mathematician nor essentially a
cyclist, so our killing-stabbing is neither essentially a killing
nor essentially a stabbing. Just as it is a contingent fact that
this individual is a mathematician and a contingent fact that he
is a cyclist, so it is a contingent fact that Brutus's action is
a stabbing and a contingent fact that it is a killing. And so,
as the man happens to be rational (qua mathematician), and
happens to be two-legged (qua cyclist), Brutus's action happens
to result in a death (qua killing) and happens to involve a sharp
object (qua stabbing).
4.5 Assessing Identity Theory's Response to Third Challenge
The analogy with the cyclist-mathematician certainly makes
it seem more plausible than it initially did that the same action
could be both a killing and a stabbing. However, there may be a
larger issue at work which would render the analogy illegitimate.
That is, someone might want to claim not just that killings,
' This argument depends of course on using the language of
the actual world to refer to entities in other possible worlds.
The argument is not claiming that the entity that we refer to
here as "Brutus's killing of Caesar" would be referred to as
"Brutus's killing of Caesar" at some other possible world where
Brutus's action did not result in Caesar's death. The claim is
only that insofar as we can pick out an entity in some other
possible world that corresponds to or is (depending on whether
you accept counterpart theory or transworld identity) the action
that we describe as "Brutus's killing of Caesar," we can
describe it as such even at worlds where Caesar fails to die.
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insofar as they are killings, necessarily result in deaths, but
rather that a killing is essentially a killing. If a killing is
essentially a killing then that sets it apart from the
mathematician-cyclist who is neither essentially a mathematician
nor essentially a cyclist. It is quite conceivable that he could
be neither, and so neither necessarily rational nor two-legged.
Both Parthood Theory and Trope Theory subscribe to the view that
if some action alpha is a killing, then it could not have been
anything else. Had things gone otherwise and not resulted in a
death, then that action alpha would simply not have occurred.
Some other action beta would have occurred instead. The action
could have been different in other unessential ways, but if it is
a killing then it cannot fail to be a killing in some other
possible world.
The dispute comes down to the question of how essentialist
we need to be about actions. Identity Theory leaves room for
many different ways in which a given action may vary. This may
run it into some trouble because where Identity Theory can make a
plausible case for Brutus's action not being a killing, it may
not be able to make a similar claim for every description of
Brutus's action.' For example, we said that it was contingently
a stabbing. Is it plausible to say that the action that was a
stabbing could have been a shooting instead? Or does the bodily
movement have to have been the same, making it the essential
feature of the action? On the face of it, the bodily movement
7 Richard Cartwright put this question to me.
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looks as if it would be a natural place for Identity Theory to
pin down what is essential to an action. However, it is also
natural to think that Brutus's stabbing could have been faster or
slower than it was. If its speed or angle were different, the
bodily movements would have been different. Hence, bodily
movement does not seem to be what is essential to the action. In
its leniency about the essential features of actions, Identity
Theory leaves many questions unanswered. The other two theories
are less lenient in this respect, making stronger claims about
what is essential to an action.
5 Conclusions, So Far
So far, although we have no definitive argument in its
favour, Identity Theory appears to be give us the most plausible
response to the question:
If an agent X does alpha by doing beta, what is the
relationship between X's doing alpha and X's doing
beta,
It is a simple and elegant theory, giving us a straightforward
answer. In every case, both synchronous and timespanning,
Identity Theory says that the relationship is identity. In
addition, although Identity Theory results in some oddities, it
has ways of explaining them that make them seem less odd and its
simplicity compensates. The other two theories are much more
ambitious in their goals, and as a result, far more complex. As
we have seen, in an attempt to call the No Further Effort
argument into doubt, Parthood Theory needs to appeal to the very
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intuitions that make No Further Effort plausible in the first
place. Trope Theory gives us a way of drawing a distinction in
timespanning cases without having to give up No Further Effort.
However, its scope creates other difficulties. In addition, we
have no convincing reason for thinking that tropes form a
distinct ontological category. Therefore, partly because the
other two theories face more serious difficulties and partly
because of its own attractive features, Identity Theory is the
best theory we have for answering the question with which we
began.
PART TWO: HOW TO ANALYZE "BY"
1 "By" as the relation of identity on events
Identity Theory gives a plausible answer to the question we
posed at the outset. However, although the theory suggests that
"by" is indicative of an identity between events, it has not
provided us with an analysis of "by." What we need to consider
is what kind of relationship, if any, "by" expresses. It may be
indicative of an identity, but can Identity Theory analyze "by"
as the relationship of identity between events?
Consider again the case in which Brutus killed Caesar by
stabbing him. Can Identity Theory analyze
(3) Brutus killed Caesar by stabbing him
as
(4) (3x)(3y)[killing, (x, Caesar, Brutus) & stabbing
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(y, Caesar, Brutus) & By(x, y).
In this analysis, "by" is a relation on events.
The difficulty that arises when we analyze "by"
straightforwardly as the relation of identity on events is that
"by", unlike identity, is not a symmetrical relationship. If we
recognize the relation "By(x, y)" and if "x = y" is true, then we
also have to allow that "By(y, x)" is true. Alvin Goldman
claims, "if an agent S does act A' 'by' doing act A, then he does
not do A 'by' doing A'" (Goldman, p. 5). For example, if Brutus
kills Caesar by stabbing him, it is not the case that Brutus
stabs Caesar by killing him.
Now, the objection is not as straightforward as Goldman's
construal of it suggests. For given (4), which must be what
Goldman has in mind as the way Identity Theory would render (3),
there are no singular terms referring to events. The sentence,
as it stands, is an existential generalization that can be made
true by any number of events. However, if we make the right
assumptions and instantiate singular terms using existential
instantiation, the objection does go through.8
What this suggests is that either "by" is not a relationship
between events, or that Identity Theory is false. If we conclude
on the basis of the asymmetry of "by" that Identity Theory is
false, then we are no just going to create trouble for Identity
Theory. we are also going to create trouble for Parthood Theory.
Recall that it is only in timespanning cases that Parthood Theory
B See "Appendix A" for the details of the proof.
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says there is a difference between the events. In synchronous
cases, Parthood Theory, like Identity Theory, asserts an
identity. But it is not only in timespanning cases that "by"
expresses an asymmetric relation (if it expresses a relation at
all). To conclude on the basis of the truth of "he won the race
by crossing the finish line first" that "he crossed the finish
line first by winning the race" is true is just as unwarranted as
it would be to conclude on the basis of the truth of "Brutus
killed Caesar by stabbing him" that "Brutus stabbed Caesar by
killing him" is true. Given that neither Identity Theory nor
Parthood Theory is plausible if we consider "by" to express a
relation on events, let us consider how we might analyze "by" as
expressing something else.
2 "By" as syncategorematic: Forming complex verbs out of
simpler ones
Hornsby, also an advocate of Identity Theory, suggests that
rather than relating events to one another, "by" forms complex
verbs out of simpler ones. Consider Anscombe's case of the man
who poisoned the inhabitants by operating the pump. Rather than
understanding "by" as expressing a relation between the actions
his operating the pump and his poisoning the inhabitants, Hornsby
claims that it creates the complex verb "to poison the
inhabitants by operating the pump" from the simpler verb "to
poison the inhabitants." Likewise for the synchronous case that
we just considered. "By" does not relate his winning the race
and his crossing the finish line first. Instead, from the verb
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"to win the race" it creates a more complex verb, namely "to win
the race by crossing the finish line first." On Hornsby's
account of "by", the action that we describe as "his poisoning
the inhabitants" and the action that we describe as "his
operating the pump" is really all along his poisoning-the-
inhabitants-by-operating-the-pump. Similarly, the action we
describe as "his winning the race" and the action we describe as
"his crossing the finish line first" is really all along his
winning-the-race-by-crossing-the-finish-line-first.
If we opt for Hornsby's account of "by", we have no
difficulty accounting for its asymmetrical character. This
account does not explain, however, why we seem to be able to
conclude, from the truth of "he poisoned the inhabitants by
operating the pump," that there was an event that was his
poisoning the inhabitants and there was an event that was his
operating the pump. consider
(5) Jones poisoned the inhabitants by operating the
pump.
if (5) is true, the most that we seem justified in inferring from
it on the basis of the account of "by" under consideration is
(6) (3x) [poisoning-the-inhabitants-by-operating-the-
pump (x, Jones)].
However, we want to be able to infer from (5) that
(7) (3x)(3y) [poisoning-the-inhabitants (x, Jones) &
operating-the-pump (y, Jones)].
The complex predicate account appears to leave "by" essentially
unanalyzed.
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3 "By" as expressing the part-whole relation on events
As we have already seen, Parthood Theory cannot analyze "by"
as a relation on events because of the identity it claims obtains
in synchronous cases. This is unfortunate because it might make
sense, especially in timespanning cases such as Brutus's killing
Caesar by stabbing him, for Parthood Theory to analyze "by" as a
relation between events and their parts." Thus, if Brutus killed
Caesar by stabbing him, and the stabbing is part of the killing,
then Parthood Theory could say that there was a killing of Caesar
by Brutus and there was a stabbing of Caesar by Brutus and the
stabbing was a part of the killing. This analyzes sentences of
the form
(2) X does alpha BY doing beta
as (where "<" means "is a part of")
(8) (3x)(3y) [doing (x, X) & doing (y, X) & (y < x)].
Besides having the virtue of being straightforward, this analysis
allows us to pick out nested events, that is, events that are
included in larger events in the way that Parthood Theory says
that the killing includes the stabbing. Giving an account of
parts of events is something that any theory should be able to
do. For even if we disagree with Parthood Theory about the
relationship between the killing and the stabbing, we might still
want to say that certain events contain other events as their
parts. For example, the performance of one concerto has as its
' Judith Thomson drew attention to this possibility and its
shortcomings in her metaphysics seminar (MIT, spring 1990).
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parts the playing of various instruments. These events are
nested in the performance of the concerto.
As I said, however, the part-whole relation does not
adequately capture "by". First, it is a relation on events and
hence does not deal adequately with synchronous cases because of
the asymmetrical character of "by." Second, if we take (8) to be
the formalization of an English "by"-sentence, then it must
translate back into one as well. But surely it is not the case
that any events that are related as part to whole can be
appropriately placed in a "by"-sentence. For example, we might
fill in y with "Brutus's moving his arm one inch," since this is
surely a part of Brutus's killing Caesar. But we do not want to
say that Brutus killed Caesar by moving his arm one inch. The
fact that not every part of an event is "by-related" to the whole
indicates that the part-whole relationship is simply not strong
enough to stand as an analysis of "by."
4 "By" as syncategorematic: Causal Verbs
we have seen Hornsby's account in which "by", rather than
expressing a real relation on events, creates complex verbs out
of simpler ones. Thomson proposes another way of analyzing "by"
in which it is syncategorematic. On this account, "by" gets
analyzed out of the action sentences in which it occurs.
Thomson points to a certain class of verbs - causal verbs -
which (i) take "by"-clauses and (ii) accept events as subjects.
For any sentence of the form
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(2) X does alpha BY doing beta
we can analyze "by" out as long as the first verb is a causal
verb. For example, "kill" is a causal verb because it takes
"by"-clauses and accepts events as subjects, e.g. we can say
"Brutus killed Caesar" and "the stabbing killed Caesar." This
gives us an analysis for causal verbs.
If we analyze "by" in terms of causal verbs, then what we
are saying in a sentence of the form "X did alpha BY doing beta,"
where the first verb is a causal verb, is that both the agent X
and X's doing beta did alpha, but that X's doing beta "did the
work." For example, in Brutus's case, he would not have killed
Caesar if his stabbing Caesar had not resulted in Caesar's death.
According to this analysis,
(1) Brutus killed Caesar by stabbing him
should be read as saying
(9) (3x)(3y)[kills (x, Caesar, Brutus) &
stabs (y, Caesar, Brutus) & ( ..L ls (x, Caesar, y)]
Brutus killed Caesar and Brutus's stabbing Caesar killed Caesar,
but the stabbing did the work. According to Parthood Theory, as
we have already seen, Brutus s killing Caesar is not the same
event as Brutus's stabbing Caesar. What makes (9) true is not
that the stabbing is a killing, but that the stabbing is a
killer. In other words, (9) is true because the stabbing brought
about Caesar's death.
This analysis is attractive because it accounts for
timespanning and synchronous cases of "by" involving causal
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verbs. However, in restricting itself to causal verbs, the
analysis is only partial. Thomson recognizes that since there
are "by"-sentences in which the first verb is not a causal verb,
there are cases that this analysis does not cover. There are two
kinds of cases involving non-causal verbs that need attention.
Both sorts of cases involve verbs that are non-causal because
they fail to satisfy the second criterion for causal verbs. They
do not take events as subjects.
The first range of cases to which Thomson draws attention
involves action verbs that do not take events as subjects because
they seem to involve intentionality. If we accept the preceding
analysis of "by" in terms of causal verbs then we must accept
that
(10) Brutus murdered Caesar by stabbing him
is intrinsically different from
(1) Brutus killed Caesar by stabbing him.
It is not entirely clear why (10) should invite an analysis
entirely different from that of (1). Except for the fact that
Brutus's action is being referred to differently, (10) and (1)
look essentially the same. While it is true that murdering
suggests more than killing does, and involves a presupposition
that the action was intentional, it is also true that in this
case, given that the killing was also a murdering, it was
intentional. The same action makes both (1) and (10) true. They
appear to have the same logical form. Why then should we suppose
that they ought to be analyzed differently from one another?
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Indeed, given the analysis, it is difficult to see how to
make sense of (10) at all. For recall that in the original case
involving the causal verb "to kill", both Brutus and Brutus's
stabbing Caesar killed Caesar, but the killing did the work.
That is, Brutus killed Caesar only insofar as his stabbing Caesar
killed Caesar. This enables us to avoid the implausible
conclusion that there are two killing events - one by Brutus and
one by Brutus's stabbing Caesar. To infer this about the case
seems unjustified, given that there can only be one killing;
Caesar can only die one death. In making this claim, however, we
are buying into the claim that Brutus does not literally "do the
work", his stabbing does. Now if this is the case, what "does
the work" when Brutus murders Caesar by stabbing him? Clearly in
this case we cannot claim that Brutus murdered Caesar only
insofar as his stabbing Caesar murdered Caesar. A stabbing is an
event and not the sort of thing capable of murder. Notice,
however, that we may say of the same case, both that "Brutus
killed Caesar by stabbing him" is true and that "Brutus murdered
Caesar by stabbing him" is true. Given the present analysis of
"by" we are warranted on the basis of the first "by"-sentence in
drawing the conclusion that the stabbing is what "did the work",
not Brutus. In the second "by"-sentence, however, not only are
we unwarranted in making that claim, but we cannot claim that the
stabbing "did the work" because stabbings are not the sorts of
things that can do the work in murderings. Since "to murder"
does not take events as subjects, Brutus must have done all the
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work himself. But it certainly makes sense to think that Brutus
brings about certain events only insofar as his actions do. And
if this is the case, then it should not make a metaphysical
difference whether we describe Brutus's action in terms of its
being a killing or in terms of its being a murdering. According
to the analysis of "by" in terms of causal verbs, however, it
does make a metaphysical difference. This putative difference
creates an implausibility for the analysis because, given that
the same event can be both a killing and a murdering, it is
unclear why we should claim that there is a metaphysical
difference at all. It is furthermore unclear why we should think
this difference, if it exists, needs to be brought out in the
analysis of "by."
The second range of cases involves non-causal action verbs
in synchronous "by"-sentences. For example, consider the verb
"to walk." For any case of an agent X's walking, we may say that
"X walked by putting one foot in front of the other several times
in a row" is true. We may do the same for "to kick," "to eat,"
"to dance," and so on. For any of these non-causal action verbs,
there is a sentence involving a synchronous case of "by" that
describes exactly what the agent did when she walked, ate,
danced, or kicked. Since this analysis addresses only causal
verbs, there is a whole range of cases like this that it leaves
unanalyzed.
The drawback of the analysis of "by" in terms of causal
verbs is that it leaves a whole range of cases unanalyzed because
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they involve non-causal verbs. Thomson recognizes this feature
of the analysis but does not consider it to be a drawback. She
thinks that a separate analysis is required for non-causal verbs
because they involve intentionality. It is not entirely clear to
me, however, why the fact that some action verbs take events as
subjects and some do not should be brought out as a difference
reflected in the analysis of "by."
5 "By" as a relation on facts
Bennett does not believe that an analysis of "by" tells us
much about the relation between events, since "by" cannot be
construed as a relation on events and actions. Nor does he claim
that "by" is syncategorematic. Rather, Bennett provides an
explicit analysis of "by" as a relation on facts.
Although we saw some difficulties in getting a grip on
tropes, since Bennett's account is about facts, it might give us
the alternative that we are looking for. Recall that according
to Trope Theory an event is a trope, viz., the instantiation of a
complex property P* at a zone. Whenever we name an event, we
refer to the entire complex property being instantiated, not just
the part of the property explicitly picked out by the name. We
capture this attractive feature of the proposal with Identity
Theory as well. That is, Identity Theory is also lenient with
respect to the way the description or name of an event specifies
the event that it does. Following an example of Bennett's,
"Leibniz's journey at T" names an instance of a property
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instantiated at T of which journeying is a proper part. But the
event includes other properties as well, e.g. being on a train,
being a travelling at a certain speed, being a going between
certain cities, and so on. Every event has a unique
corresponding fact which is "the fact that complex property P* is
instantiated at a certain zone" (Bennett, p. 128). This fact is
called the companion fact of the event. It will become clear
that we do not need to construe events in terms of tropes in
order to make sense of this analysis of "by."
Bennett analyzes "by" as a relation on facts. In any
statement of the form "X does alpha by doing beta" the first
clause of the sentence "entails something to the effect that the
subject of the clause - the 'agent' in the 'by'-statement - was
instrumental in its coming to be the case that P., where P. is a
fact or state of affairs systematically associated with [the
agent's doing alpha]" (Bennett, p. 214). For example, if Brutus
killed Caesar by stabbing him, then Brutus was instrumental in
bringing about the fact that Caesar died. An agent is
instrumental in its becoming the case that P. if something about
the agent's conduct has P. as a consequence. The second clause
of the sentence tells us what it is about the agent's conduct
that contributes to its becoming the case that P,. With respect
to Brutus, it is the fact that he stabbed Caesar that makes
Brutus instrumental in its becoming the case that Caesar dies.
P., the fact that Caesar dies, is what Bennett calls "the
end fact." of course, Brutus was instrumental in bringing about
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many facts and states of affairs by stabbing Caesar, so how do we
know which one of these is supposed to be the end fact P.?
Bennett outlines his notion of an end fact:
To the extent that we understand a sentence "[Noun
phrase][verb phrase]," we know which sentences it entails of
the form "[Noun phrase] is instrumental in its becoming the
case that [S]." Of all the values of S that make this true,
the one that has a place in [the] analysis is the strongest
noninstrumental S for which the entailment holds. The fact
expressed by this sentence is what I shall call "the end
fact" (Bennett, p. 216).
Consider, for example, the sentence "Alex boiled the water." If
it is true, it entails all of the following facts:
Something happened to the water
The water's physical state altered
The water boiled
Someone made the water boil
Alex made the water boil
of these facts entailed by "Alex boiled the water" only the third
one is the end fact. The first two are weaker than is required
of the end fact; they do not give us enough information. The
last two are instrumental facts, that is "they speak of a state
of affairs not merely as obtaining but as being brought about"
(Bennett, p. 216). The end fact must be a noninstrumental
entailment, not an instrumental one. Bennett gives several other
examples of sentences and their end facts: "He felled the tree /
the tree falls; He nets the fish / the fish comes to be in a net;
He reduces the price of silver / silver becomes cheaper"
(Bennett, p. 216). Bennett admits that "that is the best [he]
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can do to explain [his] concept of the end fact."1•
In addition to the limits on what can stand in as the end
fact, there are certain constraints "K" on the role that the
agent's conduct plays in its becoming the case that P.. The
analysis must include these constraints since different facts
about an agent's conduct might have the same end fact. For
example, "Brutus killed Caesar" and "Brutus brought it about that
Caesar died" both have the end fact, "Caesar died." However, the
sentences impose different constraints K on Brutus's conduct in
bringing it about that Caesar died. In the first case, Brutus
must have done the killing himself. In the second case, it might
be that Brutus paid Marcus to do the deed.
with these details in mind, let us look at Bennett's
analysis of "by".
Where "X does alpha..." means
Some fact about X's conduct has a K role in its
becoming the case that P....
The addition "...by doing beta" means
...namely the fact that X does beta.
Thus, "X does alpha by doing beta" means
The fact that X does beta has a K role in its becoming
the case that P.. (Bennett, p. 217)
This analysis construes "by" as meaning "...namely the fact
'o I think the notion of an end fact is something that
requires some attention. I do not want to get into it here,
however, because I think that Bennett's example give us a clear
enough general idea of what the end fact of a sentence is
supposed to be. Note that end facts are not limited to "by"
sentences; every action or event sentence has one.
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that..." and acting as an operator that turns the fact name, "X's
doing beta" into its parent sentence, X did beta. In order to
use "by" in this way, the initial clause of the "by"-sentence,
for example, "Brutus killed Caesar," has to be reconstrued as
meaning that something about Brutus's conduct had a K role in its
becoming the case that Caesar died. Now the analysis of "by" can
work. "By stabbing him" becomes "namely, the fact that Brutus
stabbed him." A complete analysis of "Brutus killed Caesar by
stabbing him" yields the following:
Some fact about Brutus's conduct had a K role in its
becoming the case that Caesar died, namely the fact that
Brutus stabbed him.
Bennett provides further details in his presentation of the
analysis. In particular, he spells out the K constraints on the
role of the agent's conduct in bringing about the end fact. I
shall briefly mention them before evaluating Bennett's proposal.
Bennett makes two main points. First, the behavioral fact about
the agent that brings about the. end fact P. must be seen as the
sole input into P.'s obtaining, e.g. the fact that Brutus stabbed
Caesar must be considered under the circumstances to be the fact
that alone contributed to Caesar's death. We do not want to
allow that certain intervening coincidences brought about the end
fact. For example, if as Brutus stabbed Caesar, all of a sudden
the earth began to shake, the building started to crumble, and a
huge column toppled over, struck Caesar on the head, and killed
him, then the fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar does not bring it
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about that P,.. Brutus does not kill Caesar at all in this
circumstance, the column does. Second, for any instrumental verb
to apply correctly in a given circumstance, it must be the case
that the causal chain resulting in the end fact P. "runs wholly
through the will of the agent." For example, as we said earlier,
"Brutus killed Caesar" and "Brutus brought it about that Caesar
died" both have the end fact, "that Caesar died." However, in
the second case it might be that Brutus hired Marcus to kill
Caesar. In that case, Marcus killed Caesar; Brutus did not.
Bennett raises this point to illustrate that our intuitive use of
instrumental verbs, and thereby, the K role that an agent's
conduct can play in bringing about a certain end fact, is
constrained by the idea that there should be no intervening
agency involved.
This analysis of "by" is the most complicated one that we
have considered so far. Its main virtue is that it provides a
uniform analysis of "by" in every case. Unlike the previous
account, we need not worry about the distinction between causal
and non-causal verbs. Nor do we need to concern ourselves with
the distinction between synchronous and timespanning cases; it
treats both cases in exactly the same way. Since the analysis is
not in terms of events, but in terms of facts instead, this
account of "by" is compatible with any theory of actions and
events that we opt for.
There remain some questions that we need to consider. It is
especially important to look at the functions that the end fact
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P. and the constraints K on the role of the agent's conduct
serves in the analysis.
First, let us examine the function of the end fact in this
account of "by." The end fact of "Brutus killed Caesar by
stabbing him" is the fact that Caesar died. That Brutus killed
Caesar is supposed to indicate that something about Brutus's
conduct played a certain role in bringing about the fact that
Caesar died. The fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar is supposed to
explain what it was that Brutus did to bring about the fact that
Caesar died. Given the complexity of the analysis, is the
addition of the end fact really necessary? What we need is an
analysis of "by" and yet before we can get that we are required
to analyze the verb in the first clause of the "by"-sentence. In
this example, we need to analyze "kill" in terms of dying before
we can begin to analyze "by". But, would it suffice to say:
Some fact about Brutus's conduct played a K-role in its
becoming the case that Brutus killed Caesar, namely the
fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar.
If the analysis did not lose anything in the process, we would be
able to avoid altogether the business of deciding what the end
fact is by taking this route. The claim that Brutus killed
Caesar by stabbing him seems to give us, in a remarkably
straightforward fashion, the fact that Brutus killed Caesar.
Does this analysis allow "by" to function as a relation between
the fact that Brutus killed Caesar and the fact that Brutus
stabbed Caesar in just the way that Bennett wants it to? We
shall come back to answer this question in a moment.
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The second complication in the analysis is the K constraints
on the role of the agent's conduct in bringing about the end
fact. The main reason for imposing these constraints on the role
of the agent's conduct in bringing about the end fact is that
different facts about the agent's conduct might have the same end
fact. If we dispense with the end fact, we might be able to
dispense with these vague K constraints on the agent's conduct as
well. In explaining the need for the K constraints, we saw that
"Brutus killed Caesar" and "Brutus brought it about that Caesar
died" both have as their end fact the fact that Caesar died.
They impose different constraints, however, on the role of
Brutus's conduct in bringing about this result. If we dispense
with the end fact from the analysis, we might analyze "Brutus
killed Caesar by stabbing him" as
Some fact about Brutus's conduct has a role in its
becoming the case that Brutus killed Caesar, namely the
fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar.
We could try analyzing the case in which Brutus brought about
Caesar's death by paying Marcus to do the deed, as
Some fact about Brutus's conduct has a role in its
becoming the case that Brutus brought about Caesar's
death, namely, the fact that Brutus paid Marcus to stab
Caesar.
Because the difference between "Brutus killed Caesar" and "Brutus
brought it about that Caesar died" shows up in the analysis if we
leave out the end fact, perhaps we do not need to specify it in
the K-role either.
These two modifications to the analysis of "by" simplify it
a great deal and make it somewhat more appealing as a result,
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that is, if they work. However, neither of them is going to
work. The end fact has to be a non-instrumental fact, such as
the fact that Caesar died, rather than an instrumental fact, such
as the fact that Brutus killed Caesar or that Brutus brought
about Caesar's death. The re:son for this requirement is that
the end fact needs to br a consequence of the agent's conduct and
so cannot include the agent's conduct. For example, the fact
that Caesar died is a consequence of Brutus's stabbing Caesar
whereas the fact that Brutus killed Caesar is not, on any of the
views we have considered, a consequence of Brutus's stabbing
Caesar. Nor is it possible for us to do away with the K-
constraints altogether. If we cannot do away with the end fact,
we need the K constraints to make discriminations and impose some
limitations where different facts about the agent's behaviour
bring about the same end fact. It cannot be the case that the
fact about the agent's conduct plays just any role in bringing
about the important result. For example, the relevant fact about
Brutus's conduct is not the fact that he borrowed a knife, nor is
it the fact that he took LSD, it is the fact that he stabbed
Caesar. For Brutus, did not kill Caesar by borrowing a knife,
nor did he kill Caesar by taking LSD, he killed Caesar by
stabbing him. We need to impose some constraints on the fact
about Brutus's conduct that played a role in bringing about
Caesar's death.
The drawback of the analysis is that, although it leans very
heavily on the K constraints, it offers only sketchy details
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about what they might involve. Until we know, despite the
complexity of the account, we do not have a very informative
picture of what the role of "by" is. In order to make this
account of "by" workable, it needs to be much more detailed than
it is.
CONCLUSION
None of the various analyses of "by" brings us much closer
to deciding which of the three theories considered in Part One
gives us the best answer to the initial question. The analysis
of "by" as a relation on events will not work for any of the
theories. All three theories claim that in synchronous cases in
which X does alpha by doing beta, X's doing alpha is X's doing
beta. In these cases, interpreting "by" as a relation on events
fails to capture its asymmetry. Two of the proposals suggested
that "by" is syncategorematic. The first maintained that "by"
forms complex verbs out of simpler ones. This proposal, however,
leaves "by" essentially unanalyzed. The second provided a
comprehensive account of "by" when it occurs in sentences whose
first verb is a causal verb. The limited range of cases to which
this account applies is a drawback, especially since it is not
clear why the difference between causal and non-causal verbs
should come out as a difference in interpreting "by." Finally,
we saw an analysis of "by" as a relation on facts. Simplifying
Bennett's account does not help and we are still left with
unspecified K-constraints on an agent's behaviour. Unless we can
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get a clearer picture of what there are, it is not clear what
role "by" plays. In addition, analyzing "by" as a relation on
facts takes us far afield from the question with which we began
at the outset. For this analysis says nothing about the
relationship between the agent's doing alpha and the agent's
doing beta.
Given that each of these ways of analyzing "by" has some
difficulties, and that aside from analyzing "by" as a relation on
events, none of them favours any one of the three theories we
have been considering, it does not look as if analyzing "by" is
going to get us any closer to understanding the relationship
between X's doing alpha and X's doing beta when X does alpha by
doing beta. Based on the considerations in Part One about tha
strengths and weaknesses of the theories, I favour Identity
Theory over Parthood Theory and Trope Theory. Its simplicity is
not compromised by the fact that it lacks the ambition of the
other two theories, although it is partly explained by it. The
fact that Trope Theory and Parthood Theory attempt to do much
more than Identity Theory leads them into complexities that
ultimately create difficulties for them.
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Appendix A
Proof for the claim that if Identity Theory is true, "by" cannot
be a relation on events. If it were, we would be warranted in
inferring the undesirable conclusion that if X does alpha by
doing beta, then conversely, X does beta by doing alpha.
Formalize
(1) Brutus killed Caesar by stabbing him
as
(2) (3x)(3y)[killing (x, Caesar, Brutus) &
stabbing (y, Caesar, Brutus) & By (x, y)].
Given the assumption that Brutus has killed only once, viz. when
he killed Caesar, and Brutus has stabbed only once, viz. when he
stabbed Caesar, and Identity Theory's claim that
(3) Brutus's killing Caesar = Brutus's stabbing Caesar
Using existential instantiation on (2), we get
(4) killing (alpha, Caesar, Brutus) & stabbing (beta,
Caesar, Brutus) & By (alpha, beta).
Making the proper substitutions based on the identity in (3),
from (4) we can get
(5) stabbing (beta, Caesar, Brutus) & killing (alpha,
Caesar, Brutus) & By (beta, alpha)
which we can generalize to give us the unwanted result
(6) (3x)(3y)[stabbing (x, Caesar, Brutus) &
killing (y, Caease, Brutus) & By (y,x)].
t0
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ESSAY TWO
THE ONTOLOGY OF ACTION AND ETHICS
61
6h
In what ways might action theory be thought to make a
difference to moral theory? Perhaps our ontological claims put
constraints on what we can or cannot say in ethics. If so, then
it would be significant for the moral theorist to know what these
constraints are. While the broad issue I am interested in is how
the ontology of action affects ethics, I shall focus this
discussion by addressing a very specific topic - the intrinsic
value of action - and postpone until later the more general
discussion. I shall argue that although the ontology of action
does constrain ethical theory to some extent, it does not
typically do so in any substantive way. The only ontological
claim that would require a shift in the way we view many of our
ethical claims is the claim that there are no actions at all. We
have no convincing reason, however, to think that the extreme
claim that there are no actions is true.
1 What is intrinsic value?
In an earlier paper, I discussed three theories of action:
Identity Theory, Parthood Theory, and Trope Theory. I was
interested in how each handled the relationship between an
agent's doing alpha and an agent's doing beta if the agent does
alpha by doing beta. For example, suppose that Brutus killed
Caesar by stabbing him. How is Brutus's killing Caesar related
to Brutus's stabbing Caesar? Identity Theory says that the
relation between the killing and the stabbing is identity.
Parthood Theory denies an identity, claiming that the stabbing is
a proper part of the larger event that is the killing. Trope
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Theory claims that every event is a trope' and that the killing
and the stabbing are different because they are different tropes.
One way in which the ontology of action might be thought to
conflict with a conclusion that we would want to accept in moral
theory emerges as follows. If we accept Identity Theory as our
theory of action2 then we have accepted the first step in an
argument whose conclusion is that human actions have no intrinsic
value. I shall show that contrary to our intuitions, no ethical
theory requires actions to have intrinsic value.
Intrinsic value is to be understood as the value a thing
has independently of what it causes or what causes it. we can
focus the issue about intrinsic value by concentrating on a
recent treatment of it by Judith Thomson. She defines intrinsic
value in the following way:
A thing has positive intrinsic value in amount D
just in case it is good in amount D but not
because of what it causes or what causes it; and a
thing has negative intrinsic value in amount D
just in case it is bad in amount D but not because
of what it causes or because of what causes it
(Thomson, The Realm of Rights, pp. 131-32).3
Given this definition of intrinsic value, the conclusion of the
argument is that no action has any value in itself; the only
value any action has derives from its causes or its consequences.
2 A trope is an instance of a complex property at a
spatiotemporal zone. I discuss tropes and Jonathan Bennett's
Trope Theory of action at length in the first paper of my thesis.
SI defend this theory of action in my first paper.
* All subsequent references to Thomson will be from The
Realm of Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19W0T.
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Now, it seems very plausible to say that human acts do have
intrinsic value. Murderings, stabbings and torturings are just
the sorts of things that we believe to be bad, not just because
of what they cause, but in some way intrinsically bad - bad in
themselves. Likewise, we think that telling the truth,
completing a university degree, and saving a drowning child are
good, not because of what they cause or bring about, but rather
intrinsically good - good in themselves. Since we have these
plausible intuitions that acts do have intrinsic value, we need
to take very seriously an argument whose conclusion is that they
do not have intrinsic value.
2 Acts do not have intrinsic value: an argument
The first premise in the argument is Identity Theory. This
theory says,
FIRST PREMISE (Identity Theory) In any situation in
which an agent does alpha by doing beta, her doing
alpha is her doing beta.
One of the implications of this theory of action is that every
action turns out to be identical with a bodily movement.' For
example, consider once again Brutus's stabbing Caesar. We know
that Brutus kills Caesar by stabbing him. Therefore, if Identity
Theory is true, the killing is the stabbing. Furthermore, Brutus
' I leave open the question of how to characterize mental
acts like "adding in your head" or "making a decision." If these
are mental actions, I don't think we want to say that they are
bodily movements, so we would have to characterize them in some
other way if IT is true. If IT is true, then any action that is
performed by performing a bodily movement is a bodily movement.
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stabs Caesar by moving his arm in a certain way. (Of course, he
has a knife in his hand; if he did not have a knife in his hand,
his moving his arm would not be a stabbing.) Therefore, again
according to Identity Theory, the stabbing is the arm moving.
Given Identity Theory and the transitivity of identity, the
killing is the arm moving. Similarly, for any action, Identity
Theory tells us that it is a bodily movement. The way we
describe the action depends upon how much information about the
bodily movement we want to give. For example, in order to
provide the information that the bodily movement caused a death,
we might describe it as "a killing." In order to provide the
information that it was done with a sharp object, we might
describe it as "a stabbing."
The second premise in the argument to the conclusion
that human actions have no intrinsic value is the No-Value Thesis
about bodily movements. This thesis says,
SECOND PREMISE (No-Value Thesis) Bodily movements lack
value. (Thomson, p. 133.)
The No-Value Thesis gets its motivation from viewing intentions
in terms of the following theory of intention:
MOTIVATION FOR SECOND PREMISE (Causal Theory of
Intention) What makes an act be intentional is its
being caused by an intention. (Thomson, p. 133)
For example, Brutus's killing of Caesar is intentional if it is
caused by an intention to kill Caesar (Thomson, p. 133). If the
Causal Theory of intention is true, then intentions cause
intentional actions, and whether or not an act is intentional is
simply a function of whether it was caused by an intention. On
67
this view, the intention is not something that accompanies an
intentional action. Nor is it something that is going on in the
agent's mind while she is performing an intentional action. It
is simply a part of the history of the intentional action. Now,
one might want to claim that bodily movements that are
intentional actions have intrinsic value in virtue of their being
intentional. However, the intrinsic value of an action cannot
come from the action's causes or its consequences, whatever those
causes or consequences may be. Thus, if the Causal Theory of
intention is true, a bodily movement's being caused by an
intention cannot give it intrinsic value. This makes the No-
Value Thesis seem very plausible.
The argument says that: (1) All actions are bodily
movements; (2) Bodily movements lack intrinsic value; therefore
all actions lack intrinsic value. Thus, there is a thesis in the
ontology of action, namely, Identity Theory, that figures in an
argument for a conclusion that is of interest to moral theory.
The moral theorist can either accept the conclusion that actions
have no intrinsic value or reject at least one of Identity
Theory, the Causal Theory of Intention, or the No-Value Thesis.
Now it might be the case that Identity Theory is false, or
that the Causal Theory of Intention is false, thereby undermining
the No-Value Thesis. Rather than addressing the merits of
accepting or rejecting each of these theses, however, it is more
interesting to consider whether the conclusion that actions have
no intrinsic value is as troublesome for moral theory as it might
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look. If all three theses were true, would there be an impact on
moral theory? We have already noted why it seems intuitively
plausible to say that our actions do have intrinsic value. Is
there any additional moral motivation for saying that they do and
for thinking that, therefore, the claim that they do not have
intrinsic value makes trouble for moral theory?
3 A Utilitarian argument for the intrinsic value of actions
Consider a case that Thomson calls Transplant:
Here is Bloggs, who is a transplant surgeon, an
extraordinarily good one - he can transplant anything
at all successfully. He has five patients who need
parts and will soon die if they do not get them; two
need one lung each, two need one kidney each, and one
needs a heart. Here is a young man in excellent
health; he has the right blood type and can be cut up
to supply parts for the patients who need them. The
surgeon asks the young man whether he would like to
volunteer his parts, but the young man says "I deeply
sympathize, but no." If the surgeon proceeds despite
the young man's refusal, he saves five lives instead of
one. (Thomson, p. 135.)
Now the question is: ought Bloggs to proceed to cut up the young
man and use his parts to save the five despite the young man's
refusal? on the face of it, I think we want to say that no,
Bloggs ought not to proceed in this case, and that his doing so
would be a blatant violation of the requirements of morality. I
agree fully with Thomson's view that any moral theory that yields
the conclusion that Bloggs ought to proceed in this case is "in
dire need of revision" (Thomson, p. 135).
The focus of the discussion is going to be a particular
issue, namely, intrinsic value. I am going concentrate to on its
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role in a particular kind of moral theor is value-based.
There is a certain idea with a long histo._ moral theory - it
has enjoyed quite wide acceptance - which we shall call, as
Thomson does, the "Central Utilitarian Idea." It says that "one
ought to do a thing, whatever it may be, if and only if more good
(even just a little more good) would come of doing it than of not
doing it" (Thomson, p. 124). The Central Utilitarian Idea has
been popular for several reasons, one of which is that it seems
plausible, on the face of it, that we ought always to maximize
goodness.
As it stands, however, the Central Utilitarian Idea is
vague and calls for interpretation. Under one interpretation -
Consequentialist Act Utilitarianism - the Central Utilitarian
Idea yields the conclusion that Bloggs ought to cut up the young
man and use his parts to save the five. Before I state it, let
me clarify some terms. Let the consequence-set of an agent X's
doing alpha be the set that contains every event that is both
discrete from X's doing alpha and occurs if X's doing alpha
occurs. These are all of the consequences of X's doing alpha."
Furthermore, let us suppose that the consequence-set of X's doing
alpha maximizes value if and only if it contains more value than
any of the consequence-sets of X's doing anything that is among
X's available alternatives to doing alpha. X's doing alpha
maximizes value because the value of X's doing alpha outweighs
i This is an interpretation of consequences supplied by
Judith Thomson. There are other ways of construing consequences,
but there is no need to go into them here.
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the value of X's doing anything that is an alternative to alpha.
Consequentialist Act Utilitarianism says,
CONSEQUENTIALIST ACT UTILITARIANISM X ought to do
alpha if and only if the consequence-set of X's doing
alpha would "maximize value" (Thomson, p. 132).
For Consequentialist Act Utilitarianism, an action maximizes
value if and only if its consequence-set maximizes value. It is
important to notice that, according to this theory, the value, if
any, of the action itself is irrelevant in deciding whether or
not that action, rather than one of its alternatives, ought to be
done. The only thing of importance is the value of the
consequence-set.
Why does Consequentialist Act Utilitarianism say that Bloggs
ought to cut up the young man and use his parts in Transplant?
Let us suppose that each death in this case has the same amount
of negative intrinsic value, in so far as it is a death. Let us
suppose further that there is no question that Bloggs would save
the five if and only if only he transplanted the parts. And
finally, let us suppose that the young man's parts are the only
ones available. Now, since Bloggs's cutting up the young man and
using his parts to save the five would have just one death in its
consequence-set, whereas any alternative would have five deaths
in its consequence-set, Bloggs would maximize value by cutting up
the young man and using his parts to save the five.
It is hardly controversial to claim that any moral theory
that yields the conclusion that Bloggs ought to cut up the young
man and use his parts to save the five is unacceptable. Our
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moral intuitions tell us that Bloggs surely ought not cut up the
young man and use his parts without the young man's consent, even
if his not cutting up the young man and using his parts will
result in the death of the five other patients. Consequentialist
Act Utilitarianism, therefore, is a moral theory that yields
false conclusions. The theory itself must, therefore, be false.
Is there any way of retaining the Central Utilitarian Idea,
but interpreting it so that it does not yield the conclusion that
Bloggs ought to cut up the young man and use his parts to save
the five? Recall that we initially introduced Transplant as a
case that might give us reason to think that actions have
intrinsic value. Consequentialist Act Utilitarianism, in
attending only to the value of the consequence-set of an agent's
doing something, does not take into account the intrinsic value
that an action might have. By supposing that actions do have
intrinsic value and by taking that value into account when we are
determining the best course of action, we may be able to claim
that Bloggs ought not cut up the young man and use his parts to
save the five because that complex action does not maximize
value.
Non-Consequentialist Act Utilitarianism is a reading of the
Central Utilitarian Idea that allows us to attend to more than
just the consequence-set of an agent's doing something. It
permits us to include the value of the action itself as well by
taking into account the value of the act-plus-consequence-set of
an agent's doing something. Let the act-plus-consequence-set of
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an agent X's doing alpha be the set that contains (i) everything
that the consequence-set of X's doing alpha contains, and (ii)
agent X's doing alpha. Non-Consequentialist Act Utilitarianism
interprets the central Utilitarian Idea as follows:
NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST ACT UTILITARIANISM X ought to do
alpha if and only if the act-plus-consequence-set of
X's doing alpha would maximize value. (Thomson, p.
132.)
Accepting this reading of the central Utilitarian Idea puts us in
a position to make a case for the conclusion that Bloggs ought
not cut up the young man and use his parts. For it might be the
case that the disvalue (or "negative value") of the act-plus-
consequence-set of Bloggs's cutting up the young man and using
his parts to save the five is so great that Bloggs's action will
fail to maximize value. If this is the case, the claim that
human actions have intrinsic value seems to have a role within a
value-based moral theory like Utilitarianism because it can help
us achieve the desired result in Transplant that Bloggs's action
is morally impermissible."
4 Can the act have the disvalue that it needs?
If we opt for Non-Consequentialist Act Utilitarianism to
avoid the trouble with Transplant, from where are we to suppose
that the action gets its negative value? The first thing to
* Notice that if actions do not have intrinsic value, then
Consequentialist Act Utilitarianism and Non-Consequentialist Act
Utilitarianism yield everywhere the same conclusions because the
action has no value to contribute to the value of the act-plus-
consequence-set of X's doing alpha.
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recall is that if Identity Theory is true and actions are mere
bodily movements, then we are on our way to the conclusion that
actions have no intrinsic value. If we retain Utilitarian
principles, then what we are in need of in order to make our
point that Bloggs ought not cut up the young man and use his
parts to save the five is a theory of action in which actions can
have intrinsic value. one way of getting what we need is to
claim that actions are more than bodily movements or sets of
bodily movements. If actions are complex entities involving
other actions and events as parts, such as they are in Parthood
Theory7, then we can make a plausible case for their having
intrinsic value.
If actions are such complex entities, then given any part of
an action that has disvalue, that part will contribute to the
overall value of the complex action. Bloggs's complex action is
his cutting up the young man and using his parts to save the
five. Among the parts of that action, his using the parts to
save the five contributes positive value to the overall complex
action, while his cutting up the young man and removing his parts
contributes disvalue to the overall complex action. In order to
achieve the result that Bloggs's cutting up the young man and
using his parts to save the five is morally impermissible, we
need to show that the cutting up the young man and removing his
parts (the earlier part of Bloggs's complex action) has enough
s ee chapter one for an extensive discussion of the
Parthood Theory of action.
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disvalue to outweigh the positive value in Bloggs's using his
parts to save the five (the later part of Bloggs's complex
action) and its consequences (five lives saved). We might reason
to this conclusion in the following way, suggested by Thomson,
...consider the subparts of that complex act. One
subpart is the surgeon's cutting the young man up and
removing his parts. Since by hypothesis the young man
did not consent to the surgeon's doing this, the
surgeon's cutting the young man up and removing his
parts is the surgeon's committing battery and theft. A
very terrible battery and theft, since the battery is
cutting up and the theft is of body parts. If any acts
have negative value, this battery and theft has
negative value, immense negative value (Thomson, p.
136).
The battery and theft needs to be so intrinsically bad that the
act-plus-consequence-set of the complex act of cutting up the
young man and using his parts to save the five will have more
disvalue than the act-plus-consequence-sets of its alternatives.
Let us consider how much disvalue we require to make this
the case. Any alternative that involves not cutting up the young
man and using his parts to save the five will result in four more
deaths than cutting him up and using his parts will. Thus, in
order for the act-plus-consequence-set of Bloggs's complex action
to have enough disvalue for it to be the case that Bloggs ought
not cut up the young man and use his parts to save the five, his
cutting up the young man and removing his parts (that is, his
committing battery and theft) must have at least slightly more
than four times the disvalue of a death. Only then will the act-
plus-consequence-set of the complex action have more disvalue
than the act-plus-consequence-sets of any alternative.
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More than four times more disvalue than the disvalue of a
death is an incredibly large amount of disvalue for Bloggs's
committing battery and theft to have. Admitted>.r Bloggs's
cutting up the young man and removing his parts is a particularly
extreme battery and theft. Nonetheless, can even this battery
and theft have more than four times the disvalue of a death?
Even if we grant that this battery and theft has enough
disvalue, this solution is not perfectly satisfactory. In the
case as described, the cutting up and removing the parts (the
battery and theft) has to be an action with more than four times
more disvalue than the disvalue of a death, and even that might
be difficult to maintain. But what if it were the case that
Bloggs could save fifteen people by cutting up the young man and
removing his parts? If the act-plus-consequence-set of any
alternative to Bloggs's cutting up the young man and removing his
parts contains fifteen deaths, then Bloggs's cutting up the young
man would have to be an action with greater than fourteen times
the disvalue of a death. (The death of the young man in the act-
plus-consequence-set of cutting him up and removing his parts
"cancels out" one death in the act-plus-consequence-sets of
alternatives to cutting him up and removing his parts.) Indeed,
for any n deaths in the act-plus-consequence-sets of
alternatives, Bloggs's cutting up the young man has to be an
action with more than n-1 times the disvalue of a death in order
for us to conclude, on Non-Consequentialist Act Utilitarian
grounds, that Bloggs ought not cut up the young man and use his
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parts to save the patients.
So even if we can do it for Transplant when there are only
five patients awaiting transplants, the n-case description of
Transplant creates trouble. It looks very difficult to attribute
enough disvalue in cases with large numbers of patients awaiting
transplants to outweigh the positive intrinsic value of Bloggs's
cutting up the young man and using his parts to save the
patients. Yet this is exactly what we need to do in order to
claim, on Utilitarian grounds, that Bloggs ought not cut up the
young man and use his parts."
Our discussion so far indicates that any moral theorist who
is concerned to defend a version of the Central Utilitarian Idea
should show an interest in the claim that actions have intrinsic
value. In particular, she should fend off any claims to the
effect that they do not, which suggests that she should be wary
of Identity Theory, or the causal Theory of Intention and the No-
Value Thesis. We have seen that the only way to get a morally
acceptable answer in Transplant using the central Utilitarian
Idea is to suppose that actions have intrinsic value and to
include that value when deciding among alternatives. Non-
Consequentialist Act Utilitarianism provides a reading of the
Central Utilitarian Idea that permits us to do this. But we have
seen that there is some trouble in finding enough disvalue in
Bloggs's action to make it impermissible.
SIn cases involving extremely large numbers, such as
thousands, millions, or billions the moral intuitions about what
is permissible become less clear.
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5 Intrinsic value, Utilitarianism, and the Mafia case
Suppose that we could find enough disvalue in Bloggs's
cutting up the young man and removing his parts to handle
Transplant. How are we to handle the following variation on
Transplant, called "Mafia"? In Mafia an organ bank had all of
the necessary parts for the five patients, Bloggs has
successfully performed all five transplants, and the five are
busy recovering from their operations. "I[The Mafia now tells
Bloggs, 'We will kill those five patients of yours unless you cut
this young man up and remove his parts, and thereby kill
him'"(Thomson, p. 141). Let us complete the picture by adding to
this scenario the fact that the Mafia will kill the five by
cutting them up and removing their parts.
Now we ask: May Bloggs cut up the young man and remove
his parts to save the five? The answer in this case seems just
as clear as in Transplant: Bloggs's cutting up the young man and
removing his parts is morally impermissible. The mere fact that
the Mafia is threatening his five recovering patients does not
make it morally permissible for Bloggs to cut up the young man
and remove his parts. But how are we going to get enough disvalue
into Bloggs's cutting up the young man and removing his parts to
outweigh the disvalue of the Mafia's cutting up the five and
removing their parts? We cannot do it by appealing to the fact
that Bloggs's action is an immensely disvaluable battery and
theft because there will be four additional, equally disvaluable
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batteries and thefts if Bloggs does not cut up the young man and
remove his parts. In short, Bloggs will maximize value by
cutting up the young man and removing his parts. Since Non-
Consequentialist Act Utilitarianism calls upon us to maximize
value, it yields the morally unacceptable conclusion that Bloggs
ought to cut up the young man and remove his parts under the
threat from the Mafia to kill the five recovering patients.
Mafia indicates that even if we suppose that actions have
intrinsic value, there are cases in which Non-Consequentialist
Act Utilitarianism morally requires actions that any acceptable
moral theory should deem impermissible.
6 Conclusions about Utilitarianism and intrinsic value
This discussion began with the suggestion that Transplant
might demonstrate one way in which ontological conclusions about
actions can conflict with moral theory. It looked as if moral
theory, particularly moral theories based on the Central
Utilitarian Idea, could benefit from the assumption that actions
have intrinsic value. However, Mafia shows that the real problem
for the Central Utilitarian Idea lies outside the issue of the
intrinsic value of action. As we have seen, even if we opt for
an interpretation of the Central Utilitarian Idea that leaves
room for the intrinsic value of action, it only gives a morally
acceptable answer in the simple case of Transplant, but fails to
give us an acceptable answer in the Mafia case.
An adequate discussion of why it is morally impermissible
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for Bloggs to cut up the healthy young man in either case is
beyond the scope of this paper, the main concern of which is to
see if there is any relationship between the ontology of action
and moral theory. For the same reason, I shall not attempt to
address in any detail what the source of trouble for the Central
Utilitarian Idea is, but I will mention briefly where I think it
lies. It is a frequent objection against Utilitarianism that it
fails to take rights into consideration, thus on occasion
prescribing apparently unjust courses of action. In the case of
Bloggs and the young man, given that the young man has not
consented to be cut up in either Transplant or Mafia, he has the
right not to be cut up. By failing to respect that right, that
is, by blatantly violating it, Bloggs is undertaking a morally
impermissible act if he cuts up the young man for whatever
reason. This seems to be the core of the problem in both
Transplant and Mafia.'
At the outset of this paper we looked at three theses
which together have the result that actions, whether intentional
or not, have no intrinsic value. We then looked at one way in
which this conclusion might conflict with what is required or
desirable for ethics. While Transplant seems to indicate that
advocates of the Central Utilitarian Idea could avoid false
conclusions by supposing that actions have intrinsic value,
Mafia shows that even with that supposition the central
' For a detailed philosophical discussion of the nature of
rights, see The Realm of Rights by Judith Jarvis Thomson.
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Utilitarian Idea yields false conclusions. As a result, it seems
not to make much difference to any reading of the Central
Utilitarian Idea whether or not actions have intrinsic value.
When we suppose that they do and that that value should count
when deciding among alternatives, we manage only to limit the
cases in which the Central Utilitarian Idea prescribes actions
that are morally impermissible, we do not eliminate them.
Are any other moral reasons to think that actions have
intrinsic value?
7 Intrinsic value and moral theory
It is my view that moral theory does not require that
actions have intrinsic value; it is enough for ethics that
actions can get their value from their causes and/or their
consequences. I cannot think of any way in which moral theory
would suffer if actions did not have intrinsic value. We have
already seen that the intrinsic value of actions makes little
difference even for the value-based theory of Utilitarianism. If
it matters so little for a value-based theory, then it should
matter even less for any other sort of ethical theory in which
value plays a secondary role. Now there may be a theory in which
value plays a smaller role and in which it is necessary for
actions to have intrinsic value. If there is one, I do not know
what it is, nor do I have any idea what it would look like.
To the extent that I believe that ethical theory does not
depend upon the claim that actions do have intrinsic value, I
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believe that ethics is compatible with theories of action that
yield the conclusion that they do, as well as with theories of
action that yield the conclusion that they do not have intrinsic
value. This is not to say, of course, that a theory like
Identity Theory, in conjunction with other theses that together
yield the result that they do not have intrinsic value, does not
constrain moral theory. It is only to say that this constraint
is not one that seriously interferes with the task of a moral
theory.
8 Ontology and ethics
This paper began with a promise to address a much more
general question than the one about intrinsic value. In asking
whether the moral theorist ought to be concerned with ontological
conclusions about the nature of actions, I was inquiring whether
anything in the ontology of action has to do with anything in
ethics. I shall argue that none of the ontological issues about
what acts are constrains what can be said in ethics in any
substantive way. In addition, I shall discuss a proposal that
there are no actions at all and consider what the impact such a
conclusion would have on ethical theory.
Since ethics seems to have actions as a large part of its
subject matter, it is natural to think that the ontology of
action might bear on ethics. An analogy between the impact that
the ontology of numbers has on mathematics and the impact that
the ontology of action has on ethics will help us understand what
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is at issue.10 For just as actions form a central part of the
subject matter of ethics, so do numbers form a central part of
the subject matter of mathematics.
In the philosophy of action and in the philosophy of
mathematics, there are two basic ontological questions to ask:
(1) What are actions/numbers?
(2) Are there any actions/numbers?
Are there ways of responding to these questions that are going to
constrain the practices or claims of the moral theorist or the
mathematician? The kind of constraints they place will depend on
how we view the role of the metaphysics.
With respect to the first question, we are not likely to
think that a particular analysis of number is going to have a
detectable impact on mathematics. It seems reasonable to take a
conservative approach to the ontology of numbers and aim for a
metaphysical analysis that does not conflict with accepted laws
of mathematics. Whatever we say about what numbers are, odd
numbers will still be odd, even numbers will still be even. If
that turned out not to be the case, then we would have good
reason to reject the proposed analysis, not to revise our
mathematics. Similarly, a conservative approach to the ontology
10 I recogn e that there are many disanalogies between
ethics and mathematics, particularly in the way each is done.
Many mathematicians might be happy to be working with constructs
and abstract systems constrained only by logical rules and
principles. Moral philosophers are constrained by more than
logic when they are developing ethical systems. The main analogy
is between the place of numbers in mathematics and the place of
actions in ethics.
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of action will not have a substantive impact on ethical theory.
Part of the business of an analysis of action is, among other
things, to account for, or at least not conflict with, our basic
ethical intuitions. For example, the theories of action that have
so far been considered - Trope Theory, Parthood Theory, and
Identity Theory - do not force any strong revisions on ethical
theory. They are generally conservative insofar as whether an
action is a trope, a bodily movement, or a more complex entity
made up of other actions and events is not going to have an
impact on its basic ethical status as right or wrong. Indeed, if
a metaphysical theory of action yielded wrong ethical
conclusions, that is, yielded conclusions that conflict with
basic ethical intuitions, then we would have a reason to
reconsider the metaphysical analysis unless it gave us a very
convincing reason to reject our moral intuitions.
Before moving on to (2), note that while mathematics does
not require any specific notion of number, it does need to
presuppose that numbers have certain properties. Similarly,
there are certain suppositions in moral theory about the
properties of actions. One common presupposition in moral theory
is that actions have causal efficacy. Almost every moral theory
requires that they do. Some Utilitarian theories, for example,
claim that actions are right or wrong in proportion to the
goodness or badness of their consequences. If the theory works
with a notion of consequences requiring that events or states of
affairs that are consequence of an action, must have been caused
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by that action, then the theory requires that actions can enter
into causal relations. Not only Utilitarianism, but most ethical
theories assume chat what our doing alpha or beta causes is at
least relevant to whether we ought or ought not do alpha or beta.
9 Ethics and the claim that there are no actions
what would a negative response to (2) mean for mathematics
and Lor ethics? As with (1), our response to (2) is going to
depend on what the ramifications of a negative response might be.
The mathematician might be able to endure a negative response to
(2) without having to revise her theories because she is
constructing logical systems. Moral theory, on the other hand,
is not something that we want to be simply the construction of
logical systems." We would like our claims to be about
something real. Logical consistency is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition of a correct moral theory. The claim that
there are no actions seems to be a claim about the ontology of
action that could make a difference to ethics.
There are two ways of spelling out the claim that there
are no actions. First, to say that there are no actions might be
to say that actions do not form a basic ontological category.
Holding this view, one would give a reductive or supervenience
analysis of actions in terms of more basic entities, for example,
the properties and spatiotemporal zones of Jonathan Bennett's
" I do not mean to be understating the task of the
mathematician.
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Trope Theory. Second, to say that there are no actions might
mean that actions do not form a real ontological category.
Terence Horgan endorses this eliminative account of action,
claiming that actions and events have no place in our ontology at
any level.1 2  The first claim, that actions are not basic, does
not have a negative effect on moral theory. Supervenience does
not deny that we are referring to something when we speak of "my
writing this sentence" or "my killing your cat for fun." If
actions are reducible to something more basic, then our ethical
claims about actions may in fact be claims about something more
basic, but that does not make them in any way illegitimate. Nor
does it require us to rethink the way we view our ethical claims.
The second claim, that actions are not real, is the one that
looks as if it might spell trouble for ethics. In "The (cse
Against Events," Horgan takes himself to be doing much more than
giving a supervenience account or a reductive explanation of
events. He is trying to show that there is no theoretical need
to have events in our ontology at all. He argues that "since
their elimination yields an important simplification of ontology,
we should banish them from existence" (Horgan, p. 28). It is
unclear exactly how we are to interpret Horgan's claim that there
are no events. He seems very careful to avoid talk of
"reduction" in favour of talk of "elimination." He seems to be
claiming that events have something of the status of witches.
12 Terence Horgan, "The Case Against Events," in The
Philosophical Review, LXXVII, No. 1, January 1978, pp. 28-47.
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That is, insofar as they do not exist, any claims that we might
make about them are false. He does not claim, however, that
there are no other ways of explaining the issues that we
typically explain by reference to events. Horgan does not offer
a uniform account of how to reduce events to other more basic
entities. For this reason, his account as he sees it is
different from a reductive analysis. There are two separate
questions about Horgan's project. First, does he successfully
show that "we should banish event from existence?" And second,
suppose it has been shown that there are no events, is it the
case that moral theory needs to dispense with them?
10 Horgan's project
Horgan proceeds by pointing to a number of areas of
philosophy that have traditionally relied on the notion that
actions and events are particular, unrepeatable entities. He
says,
the mind-body problem is often regarded as the problem
of the relation between mental events and physical
events; discussions of scientific explanation usually
assume that the entities explained are events;
causation is usually treated as a relation between
events;...and actions, a species of event, are the very
subject matter of action theory. (Horgan, p. 28.)
Beginning with causal relations and proceeding through the other
philosophical areas in which events figure prominently, Horgan
suggests ways of discussing the issues without making references
to events. His main concern is to avoid using event-designating
singular terms in philosophical discourse. For each of the areas
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to which he draws attention, he offers an interesting way of
avoiding such terms. In addition to causal relations, Horgan
addresses the issue of describing and redescribing actions and
events in the course of explaining them, how to discuss the mind-
body problem without referring to mental and physical events, and
how to preserve logical entailments in action-sentences involving
adverbial modification without following Davidson's suggestion
that we quantify over events.
In order to address the issue about ontology and ethics it
is not necessary to give a detailed account of Horgan's procedure
in each case. He does not provide a systematic way of replacing
event-designating singular terms with other linguistic forms, but
rather deals with each "event-ridden" area of philosophy
differently.
He notes that in philosophy of mind, for example, some
theories identify mental events with physiological events. If we
are to make sense of these theories at all, then events must be
particulars. Horgan maintains that we need not suppose that
events are particulars for we could instead identify mental
attributes with physical attributes, and carry on the discussion
on that level. In addition, he suggests that the tired issue of
the relationship between mental events and physical events can
just fall by the wayside because events do not exist (Horgan, p.
44).
He deals with adverbial modification much differently.
Davidson has suggested that in order to preserve certain logical
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entailments in action sentences with adverbial modifiers, we need
to quantify over events. For example, if the logical form of a
sentence reflects its logical entailments, then the logical form
of "Sebastian strolled through the streets of Bologna at 2 a.m."
should reflect the entailment "Sebastian strolled through the
streets of Bologna". Davidson suggests that we may do this by
quantifying over events so that the logical form cf the first
sentence is "There is an event x such that Sebastian strolled x,
x took place in the streets of Bologna, and x was going on at 2
a.m." (cf. Davidson, "The Individuation of Events" and Horgan,
p. 44). Taking Davidson's proposal as a challenge to give an
alternative account of the logical form of such statements,
Horgan suggests following Romane Clark." Clark expands first
order quantification theory specifically to deal with all types
of predicate modifiers, including adverbs. According to Horgan,
Clark "represents these as operators which, when prefixed to a
predicate, yield a new predicate" (Horgan, p. 44).
Without going into the details of this proposed expansion of
first order quantificational logic, it is easy to see that it is
a very different proposal from the one that Horgan makes for
dealing with events in the mind-body problem. What he says about
causation and explanation are different still. It is for this
reason that we can take Horgan to be giving something other than
a reductive account of events. He wants to deny their existence
's Romane Clark, "Concerning the Logic of Predicate
Modifiers" in Nous IV, 1970, pp. 311-35.
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altogether, concluding
that there is no apparent theoretical need to posit
events. Of course it is still possible that events
will prove indispensible for philosophical purposes
other than those we have considered here, or for
theoretical purposes within physics or some other
branch of science. But unless and until one of these
possibilities becomes actual, which I doubt will
happen, the most reasonable course is to invoke
theoretical parsimony and deny the existence of events.
(Horgan, p. 47.)
11 Horgan's project and ethics
Horgan's suggestions for doing without events are
interesting. But he has not exhausted the aspects of philosophy
in which there is a reliance on events, and since he has not
offered a systematic procedure, he is going to have to
individually address every additional area that is brought to his
attention. One significant oversight in Horgan's project is his
failure to consider the impact that an event-less ontology might
have on ethics. Ethical theory relies in many ways on actions
and events. Indeed, agents and their actions are the central
objects of moral evaluation in any ethical theory. We evaluate
agents for their goodness or badness, and we evaluate acts in
terms of their rightness or wrongness. Furthermore, many of our
evaluations take into account what ageLts and their acts cause.
In an ontology devoid of actions, we need to explain how
moral judgments can be true. If there are no actions, then it
looks as if there can be no right or wrong actions. And if there
are no right or wrong actions, then how can ethics tell us that
we ought or ought not perform them? For example, consider the
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moral judgment "I ought not to have killed your cat for fun." On
the face of it, this sentence seems to ascribe a particular
property, i.e. wrongness, to a particular action of mine, i.e.
killing your cat for fun. One natural way to represent the
logical form of this ought-sentence is "there is an action x such
that x is a killing of your cat for fun by me and x is wrong."
In order to make sense of the moral judgment in an ontology that
does not include actions we need to give the logical form of this
ought-sentence in a way that does not quantify over actions.
Based on Horgan's way of dealing with adverbial
modification, there is a response to this challenge in the
offing. Rather than quantifying over actions and assigning the
property "wrongness" to them, we could treat "ought" as an
operator. Instead of giving the logical form of "I ought not
have killed your cat for fun" as we did above, we give it as "it
ought not be the case that I kill your cat for fun." This way,
we do not talk about an agent's actions, but about what the agent
did. So, we need not say that my killing your cat for fun is
wrong, since we can say that it is wrong that I killed your cat
for fun. In this way, we avoid any singular terms that designate
actions while still accounting for individual moral judgments.
Even if particular moral judgments can be true compatibly
with there being no actions, there remains a difficulty
concerning the broader generalizations of moral theory. For
example, consider the earlier claim that no action has intrinsic
value. Without generalizing over actions, it is difficult to
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understand how we might convey the content of this claim. If
Horgan had offered a reductive or supervenient account of actions
in terms of more basic entities, then we would be able to make
sense of these generalizations in those terms. Since he does not
do this but proposes instead to eliminate them from our ontology
altogether, this route is not available to him. The inability to
handle these broader generalizations is not, of course, a
crippling obstacle for this proposal about actions. For, if
there are no actions, then it would not make sense to speak in
terms of their having or lacking intrinsic value. Insofar as
Horgan is claiming that there are no actions, there is no entity
of the sort that we had supposed of which it is coherent to claim
that it has intrinsic value. we shall have to locate intrinsic
value elsewhere.
12 What has Horgan shown?
To the extent that Horgan has only addressed a limited range
of philosophical contexts in which there is a heavy reliance on
events, he has not succeeded in showing that events have no place
in our ontology at any level. At most, he has shown that there
are ways, although not systematic ones, of avoiding reference to
events and actions in some philosophical contexts. His failure
to take moral theory into account strikes me as a serious
oversight in his project. If we cannot account for the broader
generalizations of moral theory without actions, then that gives
us an additional reason for supposing that actions are an
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important part of our ontology.
Even if there is some viable way of accounting for these
generalizations in an ontology devoid of events, has Horgan shown
that we have good reason to dispense with them? I do not believe
that he has. The mere fact that we can do away with an entity
does not, on its own, provide adequate grounds for claiming that
we need to eliminate that entity from our ontology." Regardless
of whether it is possible for ethics, or any other area of
philosophy, to get along without actions, we save ourselves a
great deal of metaphysical work by having actions and events in
our ontology. I grant that the principle of Occam's Razor is a
good heuristic to follow, but we need also to consider
explanatory simplicity and commonsense.
Having actions and events as part of our ontology provides
us with a systematic way of addressing a whole range of
philosophical issues from causation to the mind-body problem.
There is no apparent theoretical benefit to be gained from
replacing each form of analysis that relies on events with some
other more complicated analysis that does not rely on them. Far
from showing that events have no place in our ontology on any
level, the complexity of Horgan's reformulations shows how much
simpler our philosophical tasks are when we do rely on actions
" Quine makes this point about concepts: "It is one of the
consolations of philosophy that the benefit of showing how to
dispense with a concept does not hinge on dispensing with it" in
Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960, p. 190). Daniel
stoljar brought this passage to my attention in his helpful
comments on this section.
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and events.
Conclusion
Horgan has not shown that we do not need actions and
events at any level. Indeed, it is difficult to understand what
he means in suggesting that they do not exist since he is quite
clearly offering something different from a reductive or
supervenience account. But, even if Horgan has shown that we can
do without actions and events, at least in the limited cases that
he addresses, he has not shown that we must. For the purposes of
ethics, but also other philosophical areas, we gain theoretical
simplicity by supposing that there are actions and events.
Embracing the extreme claim that there are no actions would
require us to rethink the way that we think about some of our
ethical claims. For that very reason, we might question the
theoretical benefits of accepting that ontological claim about
actions and events.
In general, with respect to the impact that metaphysics has
on ethics, neither metaphysics nor ethics should be taken as
prior. As the discussion of Horgan's project has shown, it is
not necessary to embrace metaphysical conclusions that require a
radical shift in our thinking about ethical theory. By the same
token, an ethical theory that completely undermined our basic
metaphysical intuitions would also be problematic. As long as we
take a conservative approach to each area, respecting basic
intuitions about them, it is likely that metaphysics and ethics
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will not constrain one another in any substantive way.
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ESSAY THREE
RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTONOMY
ci
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It is a commonplace in moral theory to say that
responsibility requires autonomy, in some appropriate sense of
the two crucial terms in the slogan. Susan wolf has recently
made a new suggestion about how we should understand these terms.
I am going to assess her view by contrasting it with another
proposal which I shall look at first.
1 The Choice View
This proposal is very familiar. Wolf calls this The
Autonomy View, but since that is the term in the slogan, I shall
call it The Choice View. The Choice View invites us to interpret
the slogan as follows:
A person X is blameworthy or praiseworthy for one of
his or her acts - or for an outcome of one of his or
her acts - only if X could have done otherwise.
What motivates this view is clear enough. There are many
examples of cases in which we feel disinclined to blame or praise
an agent for her action because it seems right to think that the
agent could not have done otherwise. For example, consider the
following two cases.
First, consider Kleo, the kleptomaniac. She has a
psychological compulsion to steal. Do we blame her when she
steals from the department store? No, we do not. One good
reason for thinking that Kleo is an inappropriate candidate for
blame is that she could not have done otherwise. Her
psychological compulsion makes it the case that she has no choice
but to steal from the department store.
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second, consider Helen, the agent under hypnosis. Helen has
been hypnotized into being kind, considerate and generous to
everyone around her. Do we owe her gratitude and praise for her
generosity when she brings us flowers or offers to take us out to
dinner? No, we do not. One good reason for thinking that we do
not owe Helen our gratitude is that she could not have done
otherwise. The fact that she was hypnotized into treating those
around her with nothing but kindness, consideration, and
generosity makes it the case that she has no choice but to bring
us flowers and offer to take us to dinner. If we owe anyone our
gratitude, it is the hypnotist.
In each of these cases it seems appropriate for us to
withhold praise or blame. We do not hold the agents responsible
and the fact that they could not have done otherwise seems to be
a good reason to think it is appropriate for us to take this
attitude towards their behaviour.
There are at least three ways of interpreting "could have
done otherwise." The first way of understanding "could have done
otherwise" comes from G.E. Moore. According to his
interpretation, an agent could have done otherwise only if the
agent would have done otherwise if she had so chosen. This
reading of "could have done otherwise" explains why Helen and
Kleo are not responsible for their fehavio'r, as well as
explaining certain other problem cases. Kleo is not blameworthy
because her psychological compulsion inhibits her from following
any other course of action. Someone might be tempted t' say that
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Kleo could not even have chosen not to steal. But it is easy to
imagine that a kleptomaniac like Kleo might decide not to steal
and yet be driven to do so nonetheless by her psychological
compulsion. Thus, Kleo could not have done otherwise because she
would not have done otherwise even if she had so chosen.
Similarly, although we might say that Helen could not, because of
the hypnosis, have chosen to act differently, we can also imagine
that Helen might choose to act differently and yet, because of
the hypnotic suggestion, she finds herself performing these
generous acts. Thus, Helen would not have done otherwise even if
she had so chosen, and that is why she is not praiseworthy for
her behaviour.
Other cases for which this interpretation of "could have
done otherwise" accounts include cases of coercion or physical
constraint. If Carl is coerced into handing over all of the
money in the bank's vault, we do not blame him for his behaviour
the way that we would if he simply gave the money away for no
good reason. Given that he and all of his colleagues will be
shot dead if he does not give over the money, Carl cannot
reasonably do otherwise under the circumstances.' In a case
1 One might want to say that in this case, Carl does in
fact have a choice and so should be considered responsible. He
could have decided not to hand over the money, in which case
everyone would have been shot. If Carl would have done otherwise
if he had so chosen, that is, would have kept the money if he had
so chosen, then he is responsible according to this
interpretation of The Choice View. But the important thing to
notice here is that he Carl is not blameworthy for his behaviour.
If he is at all responsible for handing over the money, then he
is praiseworthy for choosing the most reasonable alternative
under the circumstances.
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involving physical constraints, Philip would not be blameworthy
for failing to alert the police, for example, if his reason for
failing to do so was that he was gagged and tied to a chair. His
circumstances made it impossible for him to get to a telephone.
Even if he chose to alert the police, he would not have done
otherwise than sit helplessly in his chair. As a result, Philip
is not blameworthy for his behaviour.
The second way of understanding "could have done otherwise"
says that an agent could have done otherwise only if she was not
causally determined to act as she did. It is this sense of
"could have done otherwise" that appears to conflict with the
doctrine of determinism. For if determinism is true, then it
looks as if no agent could ever have done otherwise, and
therefore, no agent is ever praiseworthy or blameworthy for her
behaviour. This sense of "could have done otherwise" blurs the
distinction between the normal case and the problem cases of
psyhological compulsion, coercion, and physical constraint.
A third interpretation of The Choice View's condition that
the responsible agent "could have done otherwise" will emerge
shortly when we examine what Wolf objects to in The Choice View
and why she proposes her own view, The Reason View. For tne
moment, we have two readings of "could have done otherwise."
They are:
(1) An agent X could have done otherwise only if X
would have done otherwise if X had so chosen.
(2) An agent X could have done otherwise only if X was
not causally determined to act as he or she did.
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Interpretation (1) provides the most plausible reading for The
Choice View. It accounts for the problem cases in which we are
disinclined to praise or blame an agent for what we would, under
normal circumstances, consider praiseworthy or blameworthy
behaviour. At the same time, it explains why we do praise and
blame agents in the normal case since in the normal case we
assume that an agent would have done otherwise if she had so
chosen. Only if an agent would have done otherwise if she had so
chosen, is she responsible for her behaviour. Interpretation (2)
raises a host of issues about the compatibility of determinism
and responsibility. We shall not be focusing on those issues
here. 2
2 Wolf's critique of The Choice View: The Reason View
Susan Wolf objects to The Choice View for reasons we shall
see in a moment. Her view, The Reason View, interprets the
slogan as follows:
2 Although I shall not directly address them in the body of
the present paper, Harry Frankfurt draws attention to certain
counterexamples in which an agent could not have done otherwise
yet is nonetheless responsible. In "Alternate Possibilities and
Responsibility" he focuses on cases of coercion in which the
agent had already decided to do the act in question before she
was threatened with an unduly harsh penalty unless she did that
very thing. Since the penalty is so harsh that any reasonable
person would submit to the demands of the coercer, The Choice
View would have it that the agent is not blameworthy for her
behaviour. In the end, Frankfurt offers an amended version of The
Choice View:
An agent X is responsible for one of his or her acts -
for an outcome of one of his or her acts - only if X
did it only because x could not have done otherwise.
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An agent X is blameworthy for one of his or her acts -
or for an outcome of one of his or her acts - only if X
could have done otherwise. An agent X is praiseworthy
for one of his or her acts - or for an outcome of one
of his or her acts - only if X does the right action
for the right reasons.
The Reason View has two distinctive features. First, it divorces
blameworthiness from praiseworthiness, putting different
conditions on these two kinds of responsibility. Second, it
offers a new account for only one of these. The Reason View,
like The Choice View, says that blameworthiness requires that an
agent could have done otherwise.
Based on a third interpretation of what it is to have the
ability to do otherwise, Wolf maintains that once we develop a
conception of what an agent who is autonomous in the sense
required for The Choice View is like, "we will come to see it as
something we don't particularly want to be like, and, more to the
point, as something we don't need to be like in order to make
sense of and justify our sense of ourselves as responsible
beings" (p. 48). She suggests that a different account be given
for praiseworthiness.
The third interpretation of the kind of autonomy required
for The Choice view, suggested by Wolf, sees it as a more
stringent than the ones we have considered so far. on this
interpretation, the ability to do otherwise requires that an
agent be in ultimate control of her behaviour and have the
ability to make radical choices. Both of these notions need
clarification.
According to Wolf, the will of an agent who is in ultimate
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control of her behaviour "must be determined by her self, and her
self must not, in turn, be determined by anything external to
itself" (p. 10). The will is determined by the agent in that the
choice that she makes must be "up to" the agent. As responsible
beings "we choose to do some things rather than others, and
nothing makes us choose" (p. 11). Anything less than ultimate
control undermines responsibility on The Choice View because it
suggests that something external to ourselves might be making us
choose as we do.
Wolf points out that this requirement immediately creates
a difficulty for The Choice View because it seems an impossible
condition to meet. Not only our environment but also our
heredity, both of which are external to ourselves, contribute
something to the choices that we make and influence the desires
that we have and upon which we frequently act. Wolf is going to
sidestep altogether the issue of whether we can even have
ultimate control, and claim instead that we neither want it nor
need it for responsibility.
Closely related to the condition of ultimate control is the
ability to make radical choices. Any agent with the ability to
do otherwise must, claims wolf, be able to make radical choices.
She contrasts these with rational choices made on the basis of
reason. A radical choice "must be made on no basis and involves
the exercise of no faculty" and as such "there can be no
explanation of why or how the agent chooses to make the radical
choices she does" (p. 54).
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Wolf understands reason to be a faculty that an agent
cannot help having, and therefore as an influencing factor that
undermines an agent's ultimate control of her actions. Much in
the way that an agent cannot help having many of the desires she
has and acting upon them, Wolf says
[i]f Reason is similarly a property or faculty that an
agent cannot help having (or lacking), and if it
generates motives that an agent cannot help acting
upon, then an agent who acts in accordance with Reason
is likewise not in ultimate control of her actions (p.
52).
Viewing reason, not instrumentally, but normatively, Wolf claims
that it is the faculty or set of faculties that we use to
recognize good values and to form true beliefs. Our ability to
use reason gives us the capacity to reflect upon our values and
our desires, to rationally evaluate them, and to reflect upon our
involvement in the situations in which we find ourselves. Now,
the agent who can make radical choices, insofar as there is no
explanation of how she makes the radical choices she does, must
be able to act in accordance with reason or not. She must be
able to make both rational and irrational choices, and "she must
be able to regard the most rational course of action, insofar as
there is one, as just one alternative among others" (p. 54). The
ability to make radical choices translates into the ability to
choose with or against reason with no apparent explanation for
which course of action one takes. Reasons and desires are viewed
as external factors that threaten the agent's ultimate control
over her behaviour.
Keeping in mind what she means by ultimate control and how
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that explains her view of radical choice, we may state Wolf's
interpretation of "could have done otherwise" as follows:
(3) An agent X could have done otherwise only if X
had the ability to make a radical choice, that is,
to choose on no basis.
Once Wolf has presented her conception of reason, stated that The
Choice View requires ultimate control, and explained why this
issues in the ability to make radical choices, she asks the
following question: why should we want to have the ability to do
otherwise if it requires that we be able to make radical choices,
that is, choices that could be irrational? She says:
To see this as an ability one might want to exercise,
one must view the possibility of acting irrationally as
potentially desirable. In other words, one must think
that irrational action may be as attractive as rational
action. If one thinks that acting with Reason may be
no better than acting against Reason, then one can see
the ability to choose whether to act with or against it
as an increase of options that intelligent and
perceptive agents might intelligibly want to exercise(p. 56).
Not only does Wolf view the ability to do otherwise as
undesirable, but also, insofar as it involves ultimate control,
she views it as not necessary for responsibility. Wolf argues
that an agent can be praiseworthy for her behaviour without being
able to choose against reason, that is, without having the
ability to make radical choices, as long as she does the right
thing for the right reasons. It is this claim that she offers as
a justification for introducing The Reason View with its new
necessary condition for praiseworthiness.
Wolf's case rests primarily on an example in which she
contrasts two very different agents whom I shall call Amy and
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Rachel. Amy, the first agent, is autonomous in The Choice View's
sense. She has the ability to do otherwise. As we have seen,
Wolf interprets this as the ability to make radical choices. By
contrast, Rachel, the second agent, is not similarly autonomous.
She does not have the ability to make radical choices. She can
only choose in accordance with reason; she cannot choose against
reason. Given Wolf's interpretation of what it is to have that
ability, Rachel does not have the ability to do otherwise.
Each agent finds herself faced with the following
situation: She is walking along a river and sees an
unaccompanied child drowning in the water. Each agent recognizes
that unless she saves the child, the child will drown. Both Amy
and Rachel respond appropriately to the situation by diving into
the water and saving the child. Clearly, the rational
alternative in this situation is to save the child. The
essential difference between Amy and Rachel is that Amy, unlike
Rachel, could have rejected the rational alternative and acted
irrationally instead. For example, she might have decided to
save her hair-do instead of the child. Wolf explains,
The difference between the two cases consists solely in
the fact that the first agent, unlike the second, did
not have to jump in. Despite the existence of clear
and decisive reasons to save the child, the first
agent, unlike the second, could have remained on shore.
Perhaps the first agent could have thought "I won't do
it," whereas for the second agent, given the
circumstances, such an idea was unthinkable. But one
could equally suppose that he second agent could have
had the thought - she simply could not havee taken it
seriously (p. 59).
Amy is supposed to illustrate that the ability to do
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otherwise is not a desirable ability to have. Rachel, by
contrast, is supposed to illustrate that The Choice View does not
capture the conditions for praiseworthiness since Rachel could
not have done otherwise. She could not reject the rational
alternative and so lacked the ability to make a radical choice.
As a result, The Reason View is proposed in which a new clause
for praiseworthiness accounts for agents like Rachel.
3 Amy, Rachel, and the ability to do otherwise
Now, Wolf interprets the ability to do otherwise as the
ability to make radical choices. Both agents could have thought
not to save the child, but only Amy could have taken the thought
seriously. Later, we shall see what it might mean to say that
Rachel could not have taken the thought seriously. First, what
does it mean to say that Amy could have taken the thought
seriously? For it is the fact that Amy could have seriously
thought not to save the child that is supposed to suggest that
Amy's ability to do otherwise is not something that we should
view as a desirable characteristic.
Wolf has already said that anyone who views the ability to
do otherwise as a desirable ability to have must view the option
of choosing against reason as a potentially attractive option.
Hence, she seems to be suggesting that Amy's ability to make
radical choices can only be viewed as desirable if we view the
alternative of choosing to save her hair instead of the child as
a potentially desirable alternative. Furthermore, since Rachel
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could have thought not to save the child but could not have taken
the thought seriously, whereas Amy could have taken the thought
seriously, we are given to understand that Amy could have viewed
the alternative of choosing to save her hair instead of the child
as a potentially desirable alternative. It is not simply the
case that Amy would have saved the child if she had so chosen,
but that given that Amy's choice was a radical one, there is
supposed to be no apparent explanation for why she chose the
rational course of action over the irrational course of action.
Rachel could not have taken the thought not to save the
child seriously. The irrational alternative is simply not
somthing that it is within Rachel's power to choose. She does
not make radical choices; she makes rational choices. When faced
with a clearly rational course of action such as saving the
drowning child, Rachel, unlike Amy, cannot choose against reason.
She is not in ultimate control of her behaviour because she is
under the very strong influence of reason. Hence, on Wolf's view
of what it is to be able to do otherwise, Rachel cannot do
otherwise and she would not be responsible on The Choice View.
But given that Rachel followed the rational course of action
because it was the rational course of action, she should, it
seems, be a candidate for praise. She is to be understood as a
superior moral agent whose grip on reason is so strong that she
cannot overcome it. Her reaction to her situation is analagous
to someone's getting a grip on a mathematical truth. Once we
understand that 2 + 2 = 4, for example, we cannot help but
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believe it. Our rational natures demand that we do. Similarly,
once Rachel understands what the right thing to do is, her
rational nature demands that she do it.
According to The Reason View, an agent such as Rachel can
be praiseworthy for her behaviour even if she could not have done
otherwise, as long as she does the right thing for the right
reasons. Given that The Reason View retains The Choice View's
requirement that an agent is blameworthy for her behaviour only
if she could have done otherwise, wolf is proposing an asymmetry
between the conditions under which an agent is blameworthy for
her behaviour and those under which she is praiseworthy.
If Wolf's arguments against The Choice View are successful,
then the ability to do otherwise is not a desirable
characteristic to have and is not required for praiseworthiness.
As a result, an additional clause is required in order to capture
the conditions for praiseworthiness. I shall argue that neither
of the points that wolf makes against The Choice View poses a
serious challenge to it. Although Wolf is right in thinking that
responsibility does not require ultimate control, she is wrong in
thinking that a plausible interpretation of The Choice View has
ultimate control as a requirement for responsibility.
Furthermore, the more plausible reading of The Choice View than
the one that wolf suggests captures the sorts of cases that she
has in mind when she introduces the additional clause for
praiseworthiness. As a result, the second clause of The Reason
View turns out to be superfluous. The Choice View succeeds in
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capturing the correct interpretations of autonomy and
responsibility.
4 Amy and the desirability of the ability to do otherwise
Wolf's characterization of Amy's ability to do otherwise
does make us wonder why anyone should want to have that ability.
For implicit in Wolf's portrayal of Amy is the claim that Amy
could have taken seriously the thought not to save the child,
which suggests that Amy had the capacity to view it as an
attractive alternative. Intuitively, we think that anyone who
could view letting a child drown as an attractive alternative has
a questionable moral character. However, the mere fact that Amy
could have failed to save the child need not suggest that she
viewed failing to save the child as a desirable thing to do. An
undesirable option is an option nonetheless. Indeed, it seems to
say something positive about someone's moral character that she
chose to do the right thing instead of the wrong thing.
The central difficulty in Wolf's critique of The Choice
View is her claim that the ability to do otherwise requires
ultimate control and radical choice. Although it is true on any
interpretation of The Choice View that the responsible agent
could have done otherwise and so could have chosen against
reason, we need not take this supposition the further step that
wolf takes it. That is, we have very little reason to think that
in order for an agent to be responsible on The Choice View there
can be "no explanation of why or how the agent chooses to make
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the radical choices she does" (p. 54). There is a large gap
between supposing that an agent has the possibility of acting
against reason and supposing, as Wolf then does, that such an
agent's behaviour is inexplicable. It need not be the case that
someone who could have done otherwise must make all of her
choices on no basis even when some rational basis exists. An
agent might have the option of choosing against reason and yet
still regard reason as primary. Wolf is mistaken in suggesting
that regarding reason as primary entails that one could not have
done otherwise. But in contrasting Amy with Rachel, this is
exactly what she is suggesting.
By stipulation, Amy could have done otherwise; she could
have saved her hair instead of the child. Amy did not so choose.
Nevertheless, we have no basis upon which to claim that her
choice cannot be explained. Given her circumstances, Amy
recognized that her reasons for saving the child far outweighed
her reasons for saving her hair. Far from being unable to
explain Amy's behaviour, we can explain it by pointing out that
she acted on her strongest reasons. Now if ultimate control and
radical choice require that there is no explanation of Amy's
behaviour, she must not have been in ultimate control nor made a
radical choice. But Wolf has stated that Amy fulfills these very
conditions, for she is responsible on The Choice View. since
there clearly is an explanation of why Amy acted as she did and,
since by Wolf's stipulation and in contrast to Rachel, Amy could
have done otherwise, it appears that "could have done otherwise"
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does not require ultimate control nor radical choice. For
ultimate control and radical choice require that there can be no
explanation of the agent's behaviour. Amy's choice, however, is
easy to explain.
Given that "could have done otherwise" does not rule out all
explanations of an agent's behaviour, nor does it force us to say
that such an agent must be able to find the irrational course of
action a desirable or potentially desirable thing to do, Wolf's
claim that the ability to do otherwise is an undesirable ability
to have loses its force. So while Wolf is right to think that we
do not need ultimate control in order to be responsible, she is
mistaken in thinking that The Choice View requires responsible
agents to have ultimate control and make radical choices of the
sort that she outlines. Hence, her first reason for rejecting
The Choice View is unconvincing. It remains to be seen whether
the second clause of The Reason View is a necessary addition to
the analysis of responsibility. If it is, then even if the
ability to do otherwise is not undesirable, it fails to capture
the conditions for praiseworthiness.
5 Do we need the praiseworthiness clause?
Wolf claims that there are certain agents, such as Rachel,
who are praiseworthy for their behaviour even though they could
not have done otherwise. These agents cannot do otherwise
because they cannot make the radical choices that her
interpretation of that ability requires. Unlike Amy, Rachel can
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never choose against reason. We have already seen, however, that
the ability to make radical choices does not rule out making
rational choices. That is, an agent could have done otherwise
and still have chosen the rational alternative because it is the
rational alternative. Thus, she could have done otherwise and
have an explanation for her behaviour. Amy is like that. But
Rachel is supposed to be different from Amy. We are to view
Rachel as an ultra-rational being whose only serious options are
rational options. we need to consider two questions about Rachel
in order to understand whether we need to introduce the second
clause for praiseworthiness. First, is Wolf's portrayal of
Rachel coherent? And second, is Rachel praiseworthy for her
behaviour?
Wolf's ideal moral agent, like Rachel, always acts in
accordance with right reason. According to her description, this
"agent's vision may be so clear that she cannot help seeing whihc
action is the right thing, and her virtue may be so sure that,
knowing which action is right, she cannot help performing it" (p.
81). In a different example, Gail, the gift-giver, sees a gift
for her friend and buys it, not for any occassion, but because
she "couldn't resist." As long as Gail did the right thing for
the right reasons, Wolf maintains that she deserves praise for
her generous act "whether she literally could have resisted
performing it or not" (p. 84). With the examples of Gall and
Rachel, we can get an intuitive grasp on the kind of agent Wolf
is referring to. But it is difficult to understand how these
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agents differ from Amy. That is, what is it about Gail and
Rachel that makes them unable to choose anything but a rational
alternative. The only options that they have, according to Wolf,
are rational options because they cannot take seriously thoughts
of irrational alternatives. It is only in Wolf's sense of "could
have done otherwise" that it makes sense to say that these agents
could not have done otherwise. But in Wolf's sense, "could have
done otherwise" means "could have chosen an irrational
alternative instead of a rational one." Thus, that
interpretation of what it means to be able to do otherwise does
not take us any closer to understanding how it could be the case
that some agent can choose only from rational alternatives. For,
by definition, if Rachel cannot do otherwise she cannot choose an
irrational alternative. The question is, what could it possibly
mean to say that the only options that an agent has are rational
options? And if this is the case, is this agent really
praiseworthy for her behaviour?
Intuitively, it does seem as if Rachel and Gail and other
virtuous agents who always choose in accordance with reason
deserve praise. But in these cases, "couldn't resist" and "had
no choice" are really just idiomatic expressions whose
philosophical clout is questionable. For if Gall literally had
no choice but to buy the gift for her friend, I wonder whether we
would think her praiseworthy. Surely we would prefer, upon
saying to Gail, "Gail, you shouldn't have," to hear something
along the lines of "I wanted to" or "I thought it would make you
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happy" instead of "I had no choice." What makes the surprise
gift-giver worthy of praise is precisely the fact that she did
not have to buy the gift for her friend. She chose to buy the
gift for her friend.
We are to understand that Rachel's grip of "drowning child +
I'm its only hope = I better save it" is so clear that it
unquestionably results in her saving the child, in much the same
way that her understanding that 2 + 2 = 4 is so clear that it
unquestionably results in her believing that 2 + 2 = 4. However,
in order for the analogy to go through, we need to make some very
strong assumptions about moral motivation. For, on the face of
it, beliefs do not have the same voluntary aspect about them that
actions do. For one can rationally see what the right thing to
do is, and form the belief that e.g. saving the child is the
right thing to do, but that does not entail, prima facie, that
one will do it.3 The most that it seems to entail is that one
will believe that one ought to do it.
Again, it seems as if the intuitive grip that we have about
an agent who "couldn't resist" but who nonetheless deserves
praise is not someone who literally could not have done
otherwise. That is, Gail and Rachel are ideal moral agents who
are so virtuous that we cannot imagine that they would ever do
anything but the right thing if they knew what the right thing
was. But it is simply a mistake to identify their alwajs
' Robert Stalnaker's comments on an earlier draft helped me
clarify this point.
116
choosing in accordance with reason with their being unable to do
anything but act in accordance with it. That is, it does not
seem as if they could never choose anything but the right thing,
but just that they would never choose anything but the right
thing.
Our paradigm examples of people who could not have done
otherwise, Kleo and Helen, would not have done otherwise even if
they had so chosen. It is not just that Kleo, being a
kleptomaniac, would most likely steal if the appropriate
opportunity arose, it is that she could not help but steal
because she is in the grip of a psychological compulsion. Even
if Kleo recognized that it was wrong to steal, she might very
likely be unable to help herself. Helen has been hypnotized into
being kind, considerate and generous to everyone around her. So
it is not just that she very predictably would behave as she
does, it is not open to her to behave in any other way given the
hypnotic suggestion.
If Gail and Helen are in the grip of reason the way that
Kleo and Helen are in the grip of their psychological
compulsions, they are compulsively rational and good. And if
they are compulsively rational and good, their only options are
rational ones. But the compulsively good and rational agent is
driven to act as she does by some kind of neurosis. Consider
Felix Unger's compulsive fanaticism about neatness. That is not
a virtue. We are disinclined to praise agents for compulsive
behaviour. Thus, this cannot be what Wolf has in mind for Gall
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and Rachel. They were not psychologically compelled like Kleo
and Helen. In addition, they were clearly not physically
constrained like Philip, nor coerced like Carl to act as they
did.
The only coherent rendering of Gail and Rachel that
preserves the intuition that they deserve praise is that they
always make the rational choice when they know what the rational
choice is. But this does not set them apart from Amy, who might
very well do the very same thing. As we have seen, always making
the rational choice cannot coherently entail that rational
options are the only options that an agent has. A praiseworthy
agent who always acts in accordance with reason could have done
otherwise. she would have done otherwise if she had so chosen.
And while it is true that she very likely would not choose
otherwise, it is not true that she could not.
The initial motivation for The Choice View came from its
ability to account for our disinclination to praise or blame in
certain problem cases. The most plausible way of interpreting
The Choice View has "X could of done otherwise" meaning "X would
have done otherwise if X had so chosen." Given this
interpretation, the parallel between the problem cases and Rachel
and Gail does not hold. For on this more plausible reading of
The Choice View Gall and Rachel are reponsible. That is why we
have the intuition that they are praiseworthy for their
behaviour. If it were true that they could not have done
otherwise in that they were hypnotized, or psychologically
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compelled to act in the way that they did, we would be
disinclined to think them responsible in any case.
Since there is a very relevant sense in which the
praiseworthy agent who does the right thing for the right reasons
must have been able to do otherwise, the second clause to account
for praiseworthiness is superfluous. The Choice View's
requirement that a responsible agent could have done otherwise
accounts for blameworthiness and for praiseworthiness.
6 CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion indicates why I think that The
Reason View, although it appears to be well-motivated, does not
offer a better interpretation of the slogan "responsibility
requires autonomy" than The Choice View does. The description of
Amy in the drowning child example gave us reason to think that,
on one interpretation of what it is to have the ability to do
otherwise, it is not a desirable ability to have after all. But
we have seen that while, on every interpretation, having this
ability does entail that one have the option to choose against
reason even when a rational basis for choice exists, it need not
rule out rational explanations for one's action. Autonomous
agents could have done otherwise even though they regard reason
as primary.
With this support for The Reason View undermined, we
turned our attention to the other motivation for The Reason View.
It appeared compelling because it seems that very virtuous
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agents, like Rachel and Gail, who in some sense seem to have no
choice but to act on reason, should be praiseworthy for their
behaviour. As we have seen, however, there is no clear sense in
which it makes sense to say that they could not have done
otherwise in a way that would incline us to regard them as
praiseworthy. The very idea of such agents turned out to be
incoherent, except in a very idiomatic sense. And a closer look
at what we mean with such idiomatic expressions as "I couldn't
resist" and "I had no choice" in the case of the praiseworthy
agent revealed that these agents do have options other than the
rational one. For it is not that Helen and Gail could not do
otherwise in the way that Kleo and Helen could not, but that
given their virtuous characters and their understanding of right
reason, they consistently choose to do the right thing. Unlike
Kleo and Helen, they would have done otherwise if they had so
chosen. As a result, The Reason View's second clause introducing
a new necessary condition for praiseworthiness is superfluous.
on the appropriate reading of The Choice View, it already
accounts for the type of cases that motivate that addition.
I want to suggest, then, that The Choice View is, in fact,
the correct interpretation of the slogan "responsibility requires
autonomy." Autonomous agents are autonomous because they have
the ability to make choices. Having the ability to make choices
does not mean that the autonomous agent cannot find reasons
persuasive in favour of one course of action over others and be
influenced accordingly. Agents like Rachel and Gail are
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praiseworthy for their behaviour not because their understanding
of reasons and their good characters make it the case that they
cannot do otherwise in any relevant sense, but because their grip
of reasons and their good characters make it the case the they
will always choose in accordance with reason.
I would like to suggest also that The Reason View's
introduction of the ability to use reason into the conditions for
responsibility and autonomy also seems compelling because there
does seem to be something right in thinking that our ability to
engage our reason in our actions is significant for
responsibility. Part of the problem for Kleo and Helen is that
their respective psychological conditions render them incapable
of engaging their reason. Even if they recognize that there are
options, they are unable to follow through on anything but one
course of action. But while the ability to act in accordance
with reason is significant for responsibility, it is by no means
sufficient for it. It is significant because to the extent that
we have options, our ability to use reason helps us to recognize
what they are. Insofar as we can deliberate over alternatives,
we are different from non-rational animals. But it will not do
to divorce the ability to act in accordance with reason from the
ability to do otherwise. The primary requirement for coherent
ascriptions of praise and blame is that the agent could have done
otherwise, in that she would have done otherwise if she had so
chosen. She must have a choice. Kleo and Helen might be able to
deliberate over alternatives. But they are not responsible
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because they would not have done otherwise even if they had so
chosen. Were they in a position to engage their reason in their
actions, they would have been able to do otherwise, and so would
have been responsible. Rachel and Gail are in a position to
engage their reason. They recognize what the alternatives are
and choose the right alternative for their circumstances. But it
is not as if they could not do otherwise. They could, but they
choose not to do so. For this reason, they are responsible.
My main concern has been to show that The Choice View is the
correct interpretation of the slogan "responsibility requires
autonomy" and that The Reason View, although it introduces
important considerations, does not need its second clause.
Although it may be the case that our reasons do result in action,
I have suggested that the claim that a responsible agent could
have no choice but to do the right thing is incoherent. Reason
leaves it open that we may choose to follow one course of action
rather than another because it enables us to recognize that there
are alternatives.
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